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BEYOND ORIGINALISM: CONSERVATIVE DECLARATIONISM 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION  
KEN I. KERSCH∗
“Our republican robe is soiled, and trailed in the dust.  Let us repu-
rify it.  Let us turn and wash it white, in the spirit . . . of the Revo-
lution. . . .  Let us re-adopt the Declaration of Independence, 
and . . . the practices, and policy, which harmonize with it.”
 
1
Abraham Lincoln 
   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Almost 150 years after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, the redemption of the nation from chattel slavery has become 
important—and for many conservatives, central—to the understand-
ing of American politics.  Slavery itself may be a thing of the past, but 
the purported political and constitutional lessons of its initial accep-
tance and subsequent eradication—once a preoccupation primarily of 
the liberal/left—are very much on the mind of the modern American 
right.  In a marked departure from the old, more familiar conserva-
tive narrative,2
 
Copyright © 2011 by Ken I. Kersch. 
 many of the modern movement’s most influential con-
stitutional theorists recount the nation’s experience with slavery 
through a constitutional vision I will call (as have others) “Declara-
tionism.”  As that term is used in this Article, Declarationism is the 
view that the Constitution can only be understood and interpreted in 
light of the principles enunciated in the opening words of the Decla-
∗ Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston College. B.A., Williams; J.D., North-
western; Ph.D., Cornell.  kersch@bc.edu.  I benefitted greatly from discussions at the 2011 
Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze on the Thirteenth Amendment, and in particular 
from conversations with Linda McClain.  I also benefitted from discussions with Jim Flem-
ing and Eldon Eisenach, the latter of whom kindly shared with me important works-in-
progress. 
 1. Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 
1854), in LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 93, 98–99 (1992).  
 2. By “old conservative narrative,” I refer to the story of post-emancipation depreda-
tions of states’ rights, and the property and associational rights of segregationist business 
owners, and the constitutionally impermissible expansion of national government powers.  
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the Legacy 
of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83 (2011). 
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ration of Independence, which are held to be the Constitution’s beat-
ing heart and unshakable foundation. 
In this Article, I argue that contemporary conservative Declara-
tionism offers a dramatic and morally compelling story about the long 
trajectory of American constitutional development, and serves: (1) as 
an ideological means of morally rehabilitating and redeeming south-
ern conservatism in the wake of its longtime, but now morally discre-
dited, defense of legal segregation; and (2) as an ideological means of 
unifying the diverse strands of the contemporary Religious Right.  
Both, of course, are crucial to the mission of the modern Republican 
Party. 
It is important as a preliminary matter to emphasize that the con-
temporary phenomenon I call Declarationism, though served in a 
new bottle by the contemporary right, is, in important respects, very 
old wine.  It is inherently neither liberal nor conservative, though, 
whatever its political valence, it is always intended to be dynamic and 
inspirational.  Over the course of American history, the Declaration of 
Independence has been prominently invoked by feminists,3 “free 
love” enthusiasts,4 Populists,5 anti-imperialists,6
 
 3. See, e.g., Catharine E. Beecher, A Treatise on Domestic Economy (1841) (referring 
to “[t]he great maxim, which is the basis of all our civil and political institutions . . . that 
‘all men are created equal,’ and that they are equally entitled to ‘life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness.’”), reprinted in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A NORTON ANTHOLOGY 
522 (Isaac Kramnick & Theodore J. Lowi eds., 2009) [hereinafter AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT]; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Res-
olutions (1848) (The Seneca Falls Declaration begins: “When, in the course of human 
events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the 
people of the earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but 
one to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to such 
a course.  We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created 
equal . . . .”), reprinted in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra, at 529; Victoria Woodhull, 
On Constitutional Equality (1871) (“I come before you, to declare that my sex are entitled 
to the inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”), reprinted in 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra, at 861.  
 and by a soon-to-be 
liberal president calling for the redefinition of people’s rights to meet 
 4. Victoria Woodhull, The Principles of Social Freedom (1871) (“‘Yes, I am a Free 
Lover.  I have an inalienable, constitutional and natural right to love whom I may, to love as 
long or as short a period as I can; to change that love every day if I please, and with that right 
neither you nor any law you can frame have any right to interfere.’”), reprinted in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 3, at 866 (emphases in original). 
 5. National People’s Party Platform (1892) (referencing the Declaration of Indepen-
dence in its preamble), reprinted in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 3, at 801. 
 6. Platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League (1899), reprinted in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 3, at 921. 
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the conditions of “a changing and growing social order.”7  The read-
ing of the Declaration of Independence into the core of the Constitu-
tion was also a crucial, if not the central, component of the political 
thought of both President Abraham Lincoln and the abolitionist ora-
tor Frederick Douglass.8
In his debates with Abraham Lincoln during their 1858 cam-
paign for the U.S. Senate, U.S. Senator Stephen A. Douglas’s position 
on the vexing question of slavery’s status in the newly admitted states 
and territories was that each state should resolve the issue itself 
through the democratic (and constitutional) principle of popular so-
vereignty.
  Indeed, for many on the contemporary 
right, Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, and Martin Luther King, Jr., have 
been joined in a Declarationist Triptych that serves—particularly in 
moments of moral and political crisis—to evoke awe and reverence 
for the eternal return of the American republic to its grounding in 
the principles of the Declaration. 
9  In response to invocations by those committed to banning 
slavery in the territories of the Declaration’s provision that “all men 
are created equal” and “endowed by their creator with certain in-
alienable rights,” Douglas replied that these provisions could only be 
understood in light of the practices of the 1770s, when the Declara-
tion was adopted.10  Douglas observed that the enslavement of Afri-
cans in America was generally accepted at the time.11  This meant that 
those principles were meant to, and continued to, apply to whites on-
ly.12
 
 7. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Speech (1932), reprinted in 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 
   
3, at 1170, 1177.  
 8. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND 
THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (1993) (“Thus for Lincoln constitutional meaning was scarcely 
imaginable without the Declaration as [the] ultimate source of interpretive guidance.”); 
STEVEN KAUTZ, LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITY 105 (1997) (“Abraham Lincoln, Frederick 
Douglass, and Martin Luther King often referred to the Declaration of Independence . . . .  
But they referred to the Declaration not only as our founding document, but also because 
it embodies an honorable claim about humanity, and implies a moral aspiration . . . .”).  
 9. THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, 326–27 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 
1978) [hereinafter LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES]. 
 10. See id. at 215–16 (explaining that the practice of Founding Fathers, such as Thomas 
Jefferson, of owning slaves proves that “the equality of all men” referred only to white 
men); J. DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN PERSUASION: REMAKING AMERICAN LIBERALISM 
29 (1993) (explaining that Douglas “interpreted [the Declaration’s] assertion of human 
equality in terms of the practices of the 1770s”). 
 11. See  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 9, at 215–16 (“It must be borne in 
mind that when that Declaration was put forth, every one of the thirteen Colonies were 
slaveholding Colonies . . . .”). 
 12. See id. at 216 (Douglas believed that the American government “was made by white 
men for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and was intended to be ad-
ministered by white men in all time to come.”). 
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As he made clear in his debates with Senator Douglas, Lincoln 
came to the question from a very different place.  Crucial to Lincoln’s 
position was his grounding in the Declaration.13  In Lincoln’s view, 
“the universal moral principles” referenced in the Declaration’s fam-
ous opening lines served as no less than the foundation of the Ameri-
can Union.14  “I have never had a feeling politically,” he once pro-
nounced categorically, “that did not spring from the sentiments 
embodied in the Declaration of Independence.”15  Lincoln’s animat-
ing purpose as a political leader was “to secure the moral character of 
the Union.”16  Indeed, the nation’s special status and mission in the 
world—its “solemn responsibilities”—were to vindicate these prin-
ciples.17
Lincoln repeatedly invoked the Declaration in his attacks on the 
institution of chattel slavery.
  
18  In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lin-
coln opposed Douglas’s popular sovereignty understandings with the 
position that the nation had accepted slavery in the southern states as 
part of its original constitutional bargain.19  Accordingly, he insisted 
he had no intention of interfering with that institution in the states 
where it already existed.20  An adherence to the nation’s founding 
principles, however, required that slavery not be newly instituted 
where it did not originally exist—in the nation’s great western ex-
panses.21
The other political figure who systematically recurred to the Dec-
laration as his touchstone was the abolitionist orator Frederick Doug-
lass.
 
22  After Lincoln’s assassination and the Union victory in the war, 
Douglass became the nation’s most prominent purveyor of the 
“emancipationist vision” of the Civil War maintaining that the war was 
fought to vindicate the nation’s founding, moral principles.23
 
 13. See GREENSTONE, supra note 
  This 
10, at 282 (“For [Lincoln], the declaration was not 
simply a rational statement of universal truths about the natural rights of particular indi-
viduals—it also proclaimed his nation’s covenantal status as a special people . . . .”). 
 14. Id. at 17 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Feb. 
22, 1861), in LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 282, 282 (1992). 
 16. GREENSTONE, supra note 10, at 256.  
 17. Id. at 282. 
 18. Id. 
 19. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 9, at 303. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 308. 
 22. See KAUTZ, supra note 8, at 105.   
 23. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 
106 (2001) (“With the resurgence of the Democratic Party in the South, and the waning of 
radicalism in the Republican Party, Douglass described the American people as ‘destitute 
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emancipationist vision, so passionately advanced by Douglass and oth-
ers, was besieged almost immediately following the end of the war, 
and was largely crushed by the gradual eclipse of Radical Republican 
power, the end of Reconstruction, and the subsequent late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century sectional reconciliation between 
the white North and the white South.24
After a long hiatus, the emancipationist vision of Douglass was 
revived during the mid-twentieth century civil rights movement, most 
prominently by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.  In his famed 1963 “I 
Have a Dream” speech at the Lincoln Memorial, King insisted—as 
had Lincoln and Frederick Douglass before him—that the Constitu-
tion and the Declaration of Independence should be understood as 
two sides of the Founding’s single coin.  “When the architects of our 
republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence,” King declared at the outset of his ora-
tion, “they were signing a promissory note to which every American 
was to fall heir.  This note was a promise that all men . . . would be 
guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”
 
25  King’s first articulation of the outlines of his “dream” 
was taken directly from the Declaration itself.  He dreamed that “one 
day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its 
creed—we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal.”26
Through the mid-1960s Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., 
were still largely reviled by the southern right.  Prior to the mid-1960s, 
many conservatives understood Lincoln as a staunch centralizer.
   
27
 
of political memory.’  If Republicans would stand as the party of memory, Douglass was 
happy to carry their banner.”).  Others expressing similar views included Radical Republi-
can leader Thaddeus Stevens, who illustratively insisted in congressional debates over the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment that “in rebuilding, it is necessary to clear away the rot-
ten and defective portions of the old foundations, and to sink deep and found the re-
paired edifice upon the firm foundation of eternal justice,” and Republican Congressman 
(and future President) James A. Garfield who insisted that to rebuild the constitutional 
order in the Civil War’s aftermath “[w]e must remove the rubbish and rebuild from the 
bottom.”  Id. at 55–57. 
  
 24. See id. at 92, 106.  See also WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THE CULTURE OF DEFEAT: ON 
NATIONAL TRAUMA, MOURNING, AND RECOVERY 32 (Jefferson Chase trans., 2001) (noting 
that “Woodrow Wilson was the first Southener elected to the Presidency since the Civil 
War”). 
 25. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (1963), in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 3, at 1317, 1318. 
 26. Id. at 1320. 
 27. See THOMAS J. DILORENZO, LINCOLN UNMASKED: WHAT YOU’RE NOT SUPPOSED TO 
KNOW ABOUT DISHONEST ABE 150 (2006) (describing Lincoln as a consolidator of political 
power). 
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King was seen as a suspected communist, moral reprobate, fomenter 
of disorder, and conduit for outside meddling by officious northern 
activists and politicians.28  Within the conservative movement itself, 
states’ rights southern traditionalists found their case against Lincoln 
and the federal government championed aggressively by (northern) 
libertarians like Frank Meyer, who tirelessly lambasted Lincoln as a 
crypto-fascist, quasi-totalitarian centralizer, and crusher of civil liber-
ties.29  In this earlier stage in the development of post-War conservat-
ism, the chief antagonist of the Lincoln-reviling neo-confederates and 
libertarians within the movement itself was the Straussian political 
philosopher Harry V. Jaffa.30  Jaffa—like Lincoln, Douglass, and 
King—placed the opening lines of the Declaration at the core of his 
understanding of American constitutionalism, and lionized (to the 
point of virtually deifying) Lincoln as the redeemer of these prin-
ciples.31
A telling illustration of Declarationism’s nature and new status 
with today’s right is the symbolism employed by what was once the 
flagship institution of the Old (and Deep) South, the University of 
Mississippi,
 
32
 
 28. See JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1945–1975, 84–85 (2006) (“The allegations against King only reinforced 
that circle: here was a civil rights leader who had contacts in the nation’s capital, ran an 
influential ‘outside’ organization, and attended communist training schools.”).  
 which has launched a new academic center called The 
Declaration of Independence Center for the Study of American Free-
 29. See DILORENZO, supra note 27, at 150–52 (explaining that Frank Meyer criticized 
Lincoln’s presidency as a “repressive dictatorship” that consolidated political power under 
the President). 
 30. See RICHARD BROOKHISER, RIGHT TIME, RIGHT PLACE: COMING OF AGE WITH 
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR. AND THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 93–94 (2009) (explaining that 
Buckley disagreed with other conservatives like Frank Meyer on their view of Lincoln and 
the Declaration of Independence).  For a definition of Straussianism, see infra note 118.  
 31. See HERMAN BELZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN 
THE CIVIL WAR ERA 87–88 n.52 (1998) (discussing Jaffa’s numerous essays in which he re-
lies on the Declaration of Independence and celebrates Lincoln for the same).  At the 
time, Jaffa was a staunch, and aggressively outspoken, defender of the powers of the na-
tional government, and, indeed, called for it to be involved to a much greater degree in a 
whole range of public policies.  See Harry V. Jaffa, The Case for a Stronger National Govern-
ment, in A NATION OF STATES:  ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 106, 106 (Robert 
A. Goldwin ed., 1968) (“The only agency which can marshal all the resources of the na-
tion, and order all its efforts to the overriding purposes which all share, is the government 
of the United States.”). 
 32. See FRANK LAMBERT, THE BATTLE OF OLE MISS: CIVIL RIGHTS V. STATES’ RIGHTS 
(2010); Nadine Cohodas, James Meredith and the Integration of Ole Miss, 16 J. BLACKS IN 
HIGHER EDUC. 112, 112 (1997) (“Meredith had chosen Ole Miss because it was a symbol of 
white prestige and power, a haven for the privileged and the finishing school for the sons 
of the elite.”). 
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dom.33  This center is devoted to propagating the principles of Ameri-
can freedom such as the teachings of Abraham Lincoln and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.34
The iconography of Ole Miss’s Declaration of Independence 
Center
  Mississippi’s Declaration of Independence Center 
is one of a growing number of university centers founded and run by 
staunch conservatives committed to (amongst other things) the rein-
forcement of Declarationism as a constitutional creed.    
35 is, not coincidentally, the same as that used by the Princeton, 
New Jersey-based Witherspoon Institute, an off-campus, Christian 
Right research center created by conservative Catholic natural law 
philosopher and Princeton politics professor Robert P. George.36  
With the sponsorship of the Bush administration’s National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, Witherspoon recently launched a “Natural 
Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism” web resource.37  
The resource contains banner graphics juxtaposing the opening lines 
of the Declaration. It depicts Abraham Lincoln speaking about the 
centrality of the Declaration to his political and constitutional 
thought, shows Martin Luther King, Jr.’s touchstones in Catholic nat-
ural law philosophy, and testifies to the centrality of natural law to the 
civil rights movement.38
In the following pages, I pursue a number of objectives.  First, I 
provide historical context for an important current of contemporary 
political thought that informs current constitutional understandings 
and ideologies.  Second, I enlist this historical work to underline sev-
eral claims about the nature of U.S. constitutional politics more gen-
erally.  As many scholars have observed, constitutions do many things, 
including creating and limiting governmental structures and political 
 
 
 33. Declaration of Independence Center for the Study of American Freedom, THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MISSISSIPPI, http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/independence/index.html (last visited July 
23, 2011). 
 34. See id. (posting the pictures of Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., on 
the center’s homepage). 
 35. The center’s homepage is bannered with images of Washington, Lincoln, and 
King, and features a photo of a parchment version of the Declaration, with a quill pen ly-
ing across it.  See Declaration of Independence Center for the Study of American Freedom, supra note 
33. 
 36. The apparent anomaly of the Ole Miss’s conservative-run center makes sense when 
you learn that it was founded by law professor Jack Wade Nowlin, who received his Ph.D. 
in politics at Princeton under the direction of Robert P. George.  
 37. Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism, THE WITHERSPOON 
INSTITUTE, http://www.winst.org/announcements/11_01_17_natural_law.php (last visited 
July 23, 2011). 
 38. See Natural Law, Natural Rights and American Constitutionalism, THE WITHERSPOON 
INSTITUTE, http://www.nlnrac.org/ (last visited July 23, 2011). 
 236 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:229 
institutions.39  As such, constitutions live legally and practically in law 
and in the standard operating procedures and rules of government 
(and even private) institutions.  Additionally, scholars have observed 
that constitutions also live politically outside formal institutions, 
where they are appealed to as parts of campaigns to form political 
identities, underwrite social and political movements, forge political 
parties, and motivate an electorate.  Part of my purpose here is to un-
derline the relevance of this political—as opposed to purely legal—
understanding of constitutions to our understanding of major cur-
rents of contemporary politics.40
In describing the uses of Declarationism within the modern con-
servative movement, I also seek to refute the overly simplistic histori-
cal accounts of contemporary conservatism, such as those advanced by 
the historian Nancy MacLean, that insist that neo-Confederatism is 
the “true” animating engine of that movement.  Such accounts, which 
essentially treat the modern movement as an effort to turn back the 
clock to a long-gone, and morally discredited, status quo—presumably 
to put their liberal/left political compatriots on the qui vive—elide the 
complicated dynamics of constitutional development as understood 
by Declarationism’s most sophisticated students, who work at the in-
tersection of law and political science.  One of the most prominent of 
these, Bruce Ackerman, has emphasized that those employing consti-
tutional arguments in politics are always simultaneously looking 
backwards while moving forwards.
  
41  As such, constitutional ideologies 
in the American context exist in the form of layered memory.  This 
layered memory is a form of nationalism, in which political interpre-
ters advance claims of fidelity, betrayal, and legacy, and rally others 
with calls to restoration and redemption.  In this political struggle 
over memory, opponents—and even enemies—are defined, and al-
liances are forged. Appeals to constitutional symbols like the Declara-
tionist Triptych are important parts of this process.42
 
 39. See generally BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL 
FUNCTIONALITY (2009); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitu-
tion as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Pre-
liminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1962). 
   
 40. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).  
 41. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS 1–33 (1991). 
 42. See generally BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 40, at 247; see 
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).  
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II. UNRECONSTRUCTED: THE LAST DAYS OF MAINSTREAM NEO-
CONFEDERATISM 
A.  The Modern Right Remembers the Civil War 
“[W]hat Constitution?  The Constitution as it was or the Constitu-
tion as it is?”  New York Herald (1868) 
 
“Let us have the Constitution as it was.  Let us stand square up to 
the old Constitution and we can conquer.”  Milledgeville, Geor-
gia, Federal Union (1868)43
 
 
Contention over the true “meaning” of the Civil War, constitu-
tionally and politically, began from the moment of General Lee’s sur-
render at Appomattox Court House.44  The ideological valence of the 
meanings attributed to the war, as they formed over the long term, do 
not track the categories that contemporary political scientists use to 
distinguish “liberals” from “conservatives.”  We can at least distinguish 
those who read the war narrowly from those who read it broadly and 
aspirationally.  The former believed the war, and the three amend-
ments it occasioned, ended slavery and perhaps guaranteed national 
enforcement of some basic rights.  The latter believed the war effec-
tuated a revolution in the constitutional order which transformed the 
relations between the national government and the states and pro-
vided national guarantees for the broad definition and aggressive en-
forcement of rights.45
“Conservatives,” in the contemporary sense, were on both sides of 
this divide.  Conservative (and often southern) defenders of states’ 
rights, and opponents of black social, civil, and political equality, nar-
   
 
 43. N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 25, 1868; FED. UNION, June 23, 1868 (quoted in BLIGHT, supra 
note 23, at 101, 416 n.6). 
 44. See, e.g., BLIGHT, supra note 23, at 1 (opining that determining the lessons of the 
Civil War “has been the most contested question in American historical memory since 
1863, when Robert E. Lee retreated back into Virginia, Abraham Lincoln went to Gettys-
burg to explain the meaning of the war, and Frederick Douglass announced ‘nation rege-
neration’ as the ‘sacred significance’ of the war.”). 
 45. See Michael Vorenberg, Bringing the Constitution Back In: Amendment, Innovation, and 
Popular Democracy During the Civil War Era, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 120 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003); see also 
Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1806 (2010) (“When we 
strip away these doctrinal glosses and focus on the original meaning and structural pur-
pose underlying the Reconstruction Amendments, we discover that the Reconstruction 
Power gives Congress all the authority it needs to pass modern civil rights laws, including 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That was the original point of these amendments, and that 
should be their proper construction today.”).  
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rowly interpreted the implications of the war and the resulting consti-
tutional changes.46  However, those we would later recognize as liber-
tarian conservatives—pro-market, pro-business, pro-property rights 
economic conservatives, like Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field, 
read the Civil War as having worked a revolution in the constitutional 
order.47
B.  Mel Bradford’s Lincoln 
   
As we move forward to the time in which modern ideological cat-
egories became political realities in the post-New Deal era—our main 
focus here—we can clearly discern a strain of the modern conserva-
tive movement that prominently adhered to the narrow understand-
ing of the war’s meaning, with all the attendant constitutional and po-
litical implications of that position.  Melvin E. (“M. E.” or “Mel”) 
Bradford was a leading theorist and thinker of this current of 
thought—sometimes dubbed “neo-Confederate”—in post-War Ameri-
ca.   
Most accounts of the reintegration of the South into the constitu-
tional nation focus on the post-bellum late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries.48
 
 46. See, e.g., M. E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS: ON THE MAKING AND 
RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 104 (1993) (“Despite the alteration 
that they made in the balance of American federalism, the Reconstruction amendments 
and early civil rights laws did not change the Constitution of the United States into a tele-
ocratic instrument: a law with endlessly unfolding implications in the area of personal 
rights.”). 
  Some, however, also treat the successes of the mid-
twentieth century’s civil rights movement as occasioning, if not a 
second defeat with an attendant northern conquest, then at least as a 
 47. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94–95 (1873) (Field, J., dis-
senting) (“The [Fourteenth] amendment was adopted … to place the common rights of 
American citizens under the protection of the National government…. A citizen of a State 
is now only a citizen of the United States residing in that State. The fundamental rights, 
privileges, and immunities which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now be-
long to him as a citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship 
of any State.”).  If the narrower reading of the Court’s majority were to hold, the Four-
teenth Amendment “was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and 
most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage…. [I]f the amendment 
refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhibition has a 
profound significance and consequence…. The privileges and immunities designated are 
those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments.”  Id. at 96–97.  See also 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140–44 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing for a liberal 
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit Illinois from regulating the 
amount a business could charge for use of a grain elevator). 
 48. See generally BLIGHT, supra note 23, at 31–63 (discussing reconstruction and the 
post-bellum era in the American South); WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THE CULTURE OF 
DEFEAT: ON NATIONAL TRAUMA, MOURNING, AND RECOVERY 53–86 (2001) (same).  
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“Second Reconstruction,” to which some southerners reacted as badly 
as their predecessors had to the first.49  Through as late as the early 
1980s (repudiating a longstanding strain of southern thought that 
had made its peace with the Civil War’s outcome, and even with Lin-
coln),50 the conservative movement continued to harbor a strong un-
reconstructed element of neo-Confederatism, on the one hand,51 and 
formalist, southern-based states’ rights conservatism on the other.52  
M. E. Bradford, a proud native Texan and literature professor at the 
University of Dallas, was perhaps the most sophisticated and influenti-
al neo-confederate intellectual in the second half of the twentieth 
century.53
 
 49. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 391 (2004) (“Brown [v. Board of Educa-
tion] represented federal interference in southern race relations—something that white 
southerners, who harbor[ed] in historical memory, with deep resentment, the program of 
reconstruction and the deep humiliation of carpetbag government imposed by conquest, 
could not tolerate.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (insertion in original).  See gener-
ally FRANCES LISA BAER, RESISTANCE TO PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: LITTLE ROCK, 
ARKANSAS, AND BEYOND 33–42 (2008) (describing the fierce opposition to the integration 
of schools in Hoxie, Arkansas, and the advent of Citizens’ Councils in the mid-1950s). 
  In constitutional matters, he was a strict constructionist, a 
 50. See MERRILL D. PETERSON, LINCOLN IN AMERICAN MEMORY 49, 252 (1994) (noting 
as evidence of the South’s peace with Lincoln both a gentler view of Lincoln in the Ameri-
can South after Reconstruction faded into memory and the Virginia legislature’s adoption 
of a resolution in honor of Lincoln’s birthday in 1928). 
 51. See, e.g., M. E. BRADFORD, Where We Were Born and Raised: The Southern Conservative 
Tradition, in THE REACTIONARY IMPERATIVE: ESSAYS LITERARY AND POLITICAL 115, 115–34 
(1990); Nancy MacLean, Neo-Confederacy versus the New Deal: The Regional Utopia of the Mod-
ern American Right, in THE MYTH OF SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM 308, 308–12 (Joseph Cres-
pino & Matthew D. Lassiter eds., 2010).  It is important to note that, for much of the twen-
tieth century, these conservatives could be found in both political parties; of course, in the 
first part of that century, most southern conservatives were Democrats.  
 52. See JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF 
VIRGINIA 255–58 (1957) (discussing the effect of school desegregation on the southern 
states from a states’ rights perspective).  
 53. James McClellan, Walking the Levee with Mel Bradford, in A DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN 
CONSERVATISM: M. E. BRADFORD AND HIS ACHIEVEMENTS 35, 39 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 
1999) [hereinafter McClellan, A DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM].  Trained by the 
poet Donald Davidson in the Fugitive and Agrarian literary circle in the Vanderbilt Uni-
versity English Department, Bradford was a William Faulkner specialist by trade.  Thomas 
H. Landess, The Education of Mel Bradford: The Vanderbilt Years, in A DEFENDER OF 
SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM, supra, at 7, 8–9; see also McClellan, A DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN 
CONSERVATISM, supra, at 35, 39 (Bradford was “equally at home in philosophy, religion, 
classical studies, politics, and history,” and took a special interest in literature of the South 
and American political rhetoric and thought).  Davidson, Bradford’s mentor at Vanderbilt, 
had once pronounced the Lincoln Memorial in Washington a brazen affront to southern-
ers.  PETERSON, supra note 50, at 251. 
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position he advanced and defended from an explicitly southern point 
of view.54
In the mid-twentieth century, many conservatives, such as Russell 
Kirk, left Lincoln off the maps they were drawing of the history of 
conservative thought.
   
55  By contrast, Lincoln was very much on Brad-
ford’s map as his frequent and perhaps predominant target.56  In-
deed, when President Ronald Reagan nominated Bradford to head 
the National Endowment for the Humanities, it was Bradford’s long 
paper trail of attacks on Lincoln, and Lincoln’s constitutionalism, 
which ultimately doomed the appointment.57  Under a barrage of ob-
jections from within the conservative coalition by New York neocon-
servatives such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and others, Rea-
gan was forced to withdraw the nomination, naming the Brooklyn-
born, neoconservative Catholic moralist William J. Bennett in Brad-
ford’s place.58
Bradford proudly described himself as “an impenitent conserva-
tive Southerner.”
 
59  In his many essays on the subject, Bradford de-
scribed Lincoln as a moral zealot who, in the spirit of Oliver Crom-
well, the French Revolutionary Jacobins, and the continental 
Revolutionaries of 1848, sought to impose his moral vision on the 
United States through the power of an unconstitutionally unre-
strained central state.60
 
 54. Marshall L. DeRosa, M. E. Bradford’s Constitutional Theory: A Southern Reactionary’s 
Affirmation of the Rule of Law, in A DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM, supra note 
  In an article taking its title from Thomas Jef-
ferson’s declared alarm at the Compromise of 1820, Bradford traced 
the history of the North’s centralizing efforts, inflamed by “chiliastic 
53, at 
92–93 (“The Southernness of Bradford’s scholarship was professionally problematical, as is 
evidenced by the academic ostracism imposed on him due to his Southern, states’-rights 
brand of conservatism.”). 
 55. RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND (1953).  
 56. McClellan, A DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM, supra note 53, at 35, 46–47. 
 57. See David Gordon, Southern Cross: The Meaning of the Mel Bradford Moment, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE, Apr. 2010, at 34, 34. 
 58. See id. at 34 (noting that Bradford’s support for George Wallace’s 1972 Democratic 
presidential campaign was another problem for the nomination); Benjamin B. Alexander, 
The Man of Letters and the Faithful Heart, in A DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM, supra 
note 53, at 17, 31. 
 59. M. E. Bradford, A Fire Bell in the Night: The Southern Conservative View, 17 MODERN 
AGE 9, 9 (1973) [hereinafter Bradford, Fire Bell].  
 60. See, e.g., M. E. Bradford, Dividing the House: The Gnosticism of Lincoln’s Political Rhetor-
ic, 23 MODERN AGE 10, 11 (1979) [hereinafter Bradford, Dividing the House] (interpreting 
Lincoln’s 1838 Springfield Lyceum speech to reveal his true aim—“radical alterations in 
the basis and organization of American society”). 
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moral imperatives,” to lay waste to the terms of the original constitu-
tional compact.61
Bradford characterized Lincoln’s touchstone, the Declaration of 
Independence, as the nation’s “one serious flirtation with the millen-
nial thing.”
   
62  Its legacy was made all the more damaging, he ex-
plained, through the influence of those who would read it by the light 
of “Jacobin ‘translations.’”63  Abraham Lincoln was Exhibit A in this 
regard, by dint of his “misunderstanding of the Declaration as [con-
ferring] a ‘deferred promise’ of equality,” and the Civil War struggle 
as having culminated in what amounts to a “second founding.”64  This 
understanding, Bradford explained, was “fraught with peril and car-
ries with it the prospect of an endless series of turmoils and revolu-
tions, all dedicated to the freshly discovered meanings of equality as a 
‘proposition’—a juggernaut . . . powerful enough to arm and enth-
rone any self-made Caesar we might imagine.”65  Bradford asserted 
that Lincoln, who was “very early, touched by a Bonapartist sense of 
destiny,” imagined himself in precisely such a role.66
The danger of Lincoln’s outsized sense of destiny was heightened 
by his religiosity, Bradford warned, since men who see themselves as 
“authorized from on High to reform the world into an imitation of 
themselves—and to lecture and dragoon all who might object” are 
frighteningly zealous.
  
67  “[They] receive regular intimations of the Di-
vine Will through prophets who arise from time to time to recall them 
to their holy mission.”68  The biblical element in Lincoln’s rhetoric 
grew stronger as his political career progressed, Bradford observed.69
 
 61. Bradford, Fire Bell, supra note 
  
59, at 9–10. For an earlier articulation of the view of 
Lincoln as a centralizing despot who had flagrantly violated the terms of the constitutional 
compact, see ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR 
BETWEEN THE STATES: ITS CAUSES, CHARACTER, CONDUCT AND RESULTS; PRESENTED IN A 
SERIES OF COLLOQUIES AT LIBERTY HALL, VOLUME 2, 34 (1868), available at 
http://www.archive.org/details/constitutionalview02steprich (“Mr. Lincoln came into 
power on the 4th of March, 1861.  He held that the Federal Government did possess the 
Constitutional Power to maintain the Union of States by force, and it was in the mainten-
ance of these views, the war was inaugurated by him.”).  
 62. Bradford, Fire Bell, supra note 59, at 15 n.12. 
 63. Id. 
 64. M. E. Bradford, The Heresy of Equality: Bradford Replies to Jaffa, 20 MODERN AGE 62, 
69 (1976) [hereinafter Bradford, Heresy of Equality]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 71 (interpreting Lincoln’s 1858 “House Divided” speech to have 
drawn its inspiration from Mark 3:25).  Mark 3:25 reads: If a house is divided against itself, 
that house cannot stand.  Mark 3:25. 
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Lincoln’s characteristic and, in Bradford’s view, disingenuous method 
as a moralizer was to demonize his enemies while only grudgingly 
deigning to recognize their constitutional rights.70  The political im-
plications of this method over the long-term were dire because 
“should slavery be gone, some new infamy was bound to be discovered 
by the stern examiners whose power depends upon a regularity in 
such ‘crusades.’”71
Bradford contended that there was, in truth, “no worship of the 
law whatsoever” in Lincoln’s political thought, “but instead devotion 
to perpetually exciting goals, always just beyond our reach.”
   
72  As 
such, Lincoln was “an enemy of the ‘founding’” who became “a scrip-
ture in himself,” committed to “the attribution of his own opinions to 
an antinomian revelation of divine will.”73  He regarded himself as a 
great man, the oracle of a political religion (most famously articulated 
in his Peoria Speech),74 and the wellspring of a political theology that 
would eventually “replace Church with State.”75
In Lincoln’s “House Divided” speech, Bradford explained, the 
self-dramatizing Lincoln went so far as to cast himself in the role of 
Old Testament Prophet.
   
76  It was in this high-prophetic mode that he 
alluded to “the eternal struggle between these two principles—right 
and wrong—throughout the world.”  “All that remained of his evolu-
tion” at this point, Bradford observed, “was a claim to direct commu-
nication with the god of history, of which we hear a great deal once 
Lincoln got the crisis which he wanted.”77
In his study of Lincoln’s political rhetoric, commenced under the 
tutelage of Eric Voegelin’s The New Science of Politics, Bradford limned 
Lincoln as a “backcountry philosophe, as ‘secularist intellectual’ and 
‘rational, progressivist superman,’” a politician combining a “gnostic 
formula [with] a special neo-Puritan twist.”
   
78
 
 70. Bradford, Heresy of Equality, supra note 
  “For the stage to come, 
64, at 71. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 72. 
 74. Bradford, Dividing the House, supra note 60, at 17 (arguing that Lincoln, in his Peo-
ria address, abandons the foundational political principle of compromise, offers apoca-
lypse as an alternative to his political ideology, and implies a new political religion). 
 75. Id. at 13. 
 76. Id. at 19. 
 77. Id. at 19–20. 
 78. Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted).  Amongst those conversant in conservative 
political thought, this critique of rationalism in politics would resonate with students of 
Michael Oakeshott, see MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (1962), and of 
the critique of the philosophies and the French Revolution as articulated, amongst others, 
by Gertrude Himmelfarb.  GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE ROADS TO MODERNITY: THE 
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according to [Lincoln’s] political eschatology [as set out in his ad-
dress to the Springfield Young Men’s Lyceum in January of 1838,] 
may augur either a final perfection or an apocalypse, a complete inver-
sion of the fortunate American unfolding already accomplished.  That 
which comes soon may be either the kingdom or the beast.”79  This 
Lincoln, Bradford argued, seeks “not preservation but change: radical 
alterations in the basis and organization of American society.”80
Many, Bradford claimed, have misidentified Lincoln with the 
freedom of the southern Negro, and have been misled by Lincoln’s 
populist, Jacksonian posturing.
   
81  By temperament, however, the real 
Lincoln was a maniacal, tax-and-spend Whig, and an ideologist, “a 
promising young centralist” who saw government as the roaring en-
gine for the advancement of his vision.82  Whigs like Lincoln, Brad-
ford explained, “were uniformitarians to the core. . . .  Local feeling 
and variety were [their] enemies. . . .  They connected both with the 
passions; and passion forestalled the evolution of the Union which, in 
standard progressive fashion, they defined more by what it could be 
than by what it was or had been.”83  “[T]he final Lincoln . . . [was] the 
worst. . . .  For by him the real is defined in terms of what is yet to 
come, and the meaning of the present lies only in its pointing thither.  
This posture, when linked to one of the regnant abstractions of mod-
ern politics,” Bradford warned, “can have no other result than a totali-
tarian order.”84
 
BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS 181–87 (2005); HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS 
OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES 228–29 (Phoenix ed., 1982) (1959) [hereinafter JAFFA, CRISIS].  
 
 79. Bradford, Dividing the House, supra note 60, at 11 (emphasis in original).  
 80. Id.  
 81. See id. at 16 (noting that the trouble with Lincoln devotees “is that they identify his 
politics with freedom of the Southern Negro . . . [a]nd that belief leads them to miscon-
strue what was his larger purpose, from the first.”). 
 82. Id. at 13. 
 83. Id. at 16. 
 84. Id. at 21.  Furthering his point, Bradford borrows directly from Eric Voegelin’s New 
Science of Politics: “Totalitarianism, defined as the existential rule of Gnostic activists, is the 
end and form of progressive civilization.”  Id. at 24 n.84 (citing ERIC VOEGELIN, NEW 
SCIENCE OF POLITICS 132 (1952)).  Bradford notes, additionally, “This entire essay is in ob-
vious debt to Professor Voegelin’s discussion of Richard Hooker’s critique of the Puritan 
mind, The New Science of Politics, pp. 133–152.”  Id. at 24 n.85.  For a similar understanding 
of Lincoln as a proto-authoritarian/totalitarian, on the model of Bismarck or Lenin, see 
also EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR xviii–xix (1962) (“Each of these men [referring to Bismarck, Lenin, and Lin-
coln], through the pressure of the power he found himself exercising, became an uncom-
promising dictator . . . .”).  Lest one think Voegelin’s ideas to be of mere antiquarian in-
terest, the Eric Voegelin Society (“EVS”) regularly sponsors a large number of panels—
wildly disproportionate, one might think, to their numbers—at the annual meeting of the 
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Bradford lamented that, in the Civil War’s aftermath, the nation 
might have committed itself to a “second founding” that was “digesti-
ble—suited under certain circumstances to accommodation with the 
first.”85  “Emancipation appeared to have changed nothing substantial 
in the basic confederal framework,” he concluded.  “Neither did it at-
tempt any multiracial miracles . . . .”86  Unfortunately however, for 
some, “the connection between blacks and American millennialism 
[only] intensified,” in the post-bellum United States, and “Equality 
(capital ‘E’)” was placed at the center of their political understand-
ings.87  With the arrival of the rights revolution in the mid-twentieth 
century, the Civil War moment at last became “the Trojan Horse of 
our homegrown Jacobinism.”88
Rights Revolution egalitarianism was founded upon an uncom-
promising denial of localism, “a hatred of plenitude . . . a denial of 
the variety of Creation, ‘abolishing the constitution of being, with its 
origin in divine, transcendent being, and replacing it with a world-
immanent order of being, the perfection of which lies in the realm of 
human action [and proceeds from a human dream].’”
 
89
 
American Political Science Association (“APSA”) to this day.  The EVS is a discursive 
community that is highly critical of the menace of the sort of “progressivism” that Voegelin 
had limned in The New Science of Politics.  They are, that is, conservatives in the age of Ob-
ama.  The EVS, in other words, has become the institutional sponsor of conservative pa-
nels (fifteen at the 2010 meeting) at the preeminent meeting for contemporary political 
scientists.  ERIC VOEGELIN INSTITUTE, http://www.lsu.edu/artsci/groups/voegelin/society 
/2010%20Papers/ (last visited July 10, 2011).  The large number of panels is likely due to 
the fact that the group attends these panels in large numbers, packing the rooms.  The 
allotment of panels at APSA meetings is derived from the attendance of a sponsor’s panels 
at the previous annual meeting. See American Political Science Association, Memorandum: 
2006 Panel Allocations for Program Committee Divisions and Related Groups, available at 
http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/2006%20M%20E%20M%20O%20R%20A%20N%20D%
20U%20M.pdf (describing the APSA annual meeting panel allocation process). 
  “Pure mil-
lennialism of the gnostic sort,” Bradford warned, “is . . . ever restless, 
never satisfied. . . .  [It] entails the fracturing of hard won communal 
bonds in the implementation of someone’s private version of the su-
 85. Bradford, Fire Bell, supra note 59, at 10.  
 86. Id.  See also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 14 (1977) (explaining that after a Civil War that ultimately 
resulted in the emancipation of the slaves, the war-weary North, generally, and the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically, were extremely reluctant to pursue other ab-
olitionist goals, such as black suffrage). 
 87. Bradford, Fire Bell, supra note 59, at 10. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 11 (quoting ERIC VOEGELIN, SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND GNOSTICISM 99–100 
(1968) (insertion in original)).  
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pernal good; and in a pluralistic society, implementation of such vi-
sions is usually perceived as moralistic aggression . . . .”90
“As the South has always recognized,” Bradford explained, “pa-
tronizing, ‘for-the-Negro’ millennialism has had its primary meaning 
and ultimate promise exposed in those other species of utopian hope 
for which it broke trail. . . .  [I]t has been a stalking horse for objec-
tives never able to command national assent—never except as they hid 
behind or within the . . . one ‘sacred’ cause.”
   
91
C.  Mel Bradford’s Jaffa  
  When these are 
achieved, diversity, culture, and, ultimately, freedom are lost.   
Bradford’s most immediate targets in setting out these under-
standings were not left-liberals (who almost certainly would not be lis-
tening to him), but fellow movement conservatives.  His chief con-
servative antagonist was the Straussian political philosopher Harry 
Jaffa, a passionate admirer of Lincoln and a tireless proponent of the 
view (shared with his hero) that the Declaration of Independence 
serves as the lodestar of the American constitutional tradition.92
Jaffa’s insistence on the centrality to the American constitutional 
tradition of “Equality, with the capital ‘E,’” Bradford thundered, “is 
the antonym of every legitimate conservative principle.”
   
93  “[T]here is 
no man equal to any other,” he insisted, “except perhaps in the spe-
cial, and politically untranslatable, understanding of the Deity.  Not 
intellectually or physically or economically or even morally. . . .  Such is, of 
course, the genuinely self-evident proposition.”94
 
 90. Id.  Although Bradford did not deny that a millennialist thread had run through all 
of American history, he insisted that history taught nevertheless that “the total nation has, 
characteristically, despised and rejected who or whatever aspired to dragoon its way to 
such beatitudes through the instruments of federal policy.”  Id. at 11–12.  (Bradford goes 
on to point out that the only full exception to this rule is the “civil rights revolution,” citing 
“reverse discrimination, racial quotas, assignment of teachers and workers by color, grad-
ing by court order, federal involvement with zoning practices or intervention in the reloca-
tion of business firms” as “positive millennialist injunctions.”  Id.). 
  The mistaken 
 91. Id. at 13.  
 92. See Harry V. Jaffa, Equality as a Conservative Principle, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV., 471, 476 
(1975) [hereinafter Jaffa, Equality] (reviewing WILLMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, 
THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1970)) (“We believe that the 
Declaration of Independence is the central document of our political tradition . . . .”). 
 93. Bradford, Heresy of Equality, supra note 64, at 62. 
 94. Id. (emphasis in original).  Jaffa was himself responding to Willmoore Kendall and 
George W. Carey’s The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition.  Jaffa, Equality, supra 
note 92, at 476.  Jaffa seems to reject the charge that he has anything to do with modern 
utopian egalitarian understandings of equality, which go “far beyond the scope of law, and 
sometimes were in flat contradiction to the principles of the earlier demands for full 
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commitment to equality, Bradford warned, will lead ineluctably to a 
demand for the equality of condition, as advanced by an increasingly 
all-powerful Leviathan, a docile, manipulated populace under the 
control of an army of elites.95  Far from being conservative, this is 
nothing more than “the Old Liberalism hidden under a Union battle 
flag.”96
Lincoln’s distorted understandings of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence were bad enough.  But, Bradford believed, Harry Jaffa had 
only compounded Lincoln’s error through “his treatment of the 
second sentence of that document in abstraction from its whole: in-
deed, of the first part of that sentence in abstraction from its re-
mainder, to say nothing of the larger text.”
  
97  Jaffa, Bradford ob-
served, “filters the rest of the Declaration (and later expressions of the 
American political faith) back and forth through the measure of that 
sentence until he has (or so he imagines) achieved its baptism in the 
pure waters of higher law.”98  In doing so, he “sets up a false dilemma: 
we must be . . . ‘committed’ to Equality or we are ‘open to the relativ-
ism and historicism that is the theoretical ground of modern totalita-
rian regimes.”99  Only a firm commitment to that single phrase of the 
Declaration, Jaffa has oddly concluded, will save us from Hitler and 
Stalin.100  “I agree with Professor Jaffa concerning the dangers of rela-
tivism,” Bradford wrote.101  “A Christian must.”102  But, all the same, 
“we must resist the tendency to thrust familiar contemporary pseudo-
religious notions back into texts where they are unlikely to appear.”103
As a Straussian, Jaffa had insisted upon treating the “all men are 
created equal” clause “as one of Lincoln’s beloved Euclidian proposi-
tions . . . .”
 
104
 
equality under law.”  JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 
  Jaffa and his ilk “have approached the task of explica-
tion as if the Declaration existed, sui generis, in a Platonic empy-
78, at 11. Jaffa notes that Lincoln also disap-
proved of the “temper and . . . methods” of radical reformism.  Id. at 245.  
 95. Bradford, Heresy of Equality, supra note 64, at 63.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 64. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  The ludicrousness of this all-too-characteristic Straussian move, Bradford ob-
served, demonstrated the problems arising “from the habit of reading legal, poetic, and 
rhetorical documents as if they were bits of revealed truth or statements of systematic 
thought.”  Id. 
 101. Id. at 65. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
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rean.”105  They treat the Founding and the Constitution the same 
way.106  But “the Declaration is not implicit in the Constitution except 
as it made possible free ratification by the independent states.  In 
truth, many rights are secured under the Constitution that are not 
present in the Declaration, however it be construed.”107
The sort of unreconstructed neo-confederatism that Nancy Mac-
Lean has argued serves as the grounding for post-War American con-
servatism is certainly evident—albeit in a distinctive guise—in the 
thought of M. E. Bradford.  Bradford’s rejection of the opening lines 
of the Declaration of Independence as constitutional touchstones, 
and of Lincoln as a constitutional vindicator and savior, along with his 
insistence on narrowly interpreting the meaning of the Civil War as 
having effectuated no sharp break with the “confederal” antebellum 
constitutional order, place him squarely within this old conservative 
tradition.  Even so, his insistence on characterizing Lincoln as a slave 
to the utopian, “uniformitarian,” and, ultimately, totalitarian millen-
nial abstractions allegedly characteristic of twentieth century progres-
sives, demonstrates his decidedly modern concerns.  The neoconfe-
derate Bradford, however, was locked in a raging intellectual battle 
for the soul of the post-War conservative movement with Harry Jaffa—
who stands about as far from neoconfederatism as imaginable—as a 
fervent proponent of both Lincoln and the centrality of the Declara-
tion to the American constitutional tradition.  Unlike Bradford, Jaffa 
was a man of ascending prominence on the post-War American right.  
   
III.  THE BIRTH OF CONTEMPORARY DECLARATIONIST CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY  
A.  Harry Jaffa’s (Straussian) Lincoln 
M. E. Bradford’s truculently localist, pro-southern, neo-
confederate conservatism, whatever its virtues as a species of political 
thought, was not likely to have much of a political future in the im-
mediate post-civil rights era, when the states’-rights position was tied 
so closely to the lost causes of racism and segregation.  President Rea-
gan’s withdrawal of Bradford’s nomination to head the National En-
dowment for the Humanities was a clear indication that, whatever the 
 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 68.  See also WILLMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS 
OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 89–90 (1970) (arguing that it was the Constitu-
tion and not the Declaration of Independence that started our nation, and that the Decla-
ration instead “establish[ed] a baker’s dozen of new sovereignties”).      
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standing of such views within the precincts of the out-of-power Old 
Guard, this vision would not serve within a right that now controlled 
the national government, and had realistic, long-term hopes of retain-
ing that power.  By contrast, Harry Jaffa’s star was clearly rising.108
By the 1980s, Jaffa was hardly a new figure on the intellectual 
right.  Credited with penning the most famous line of Barry Goldwa-
ter’s speech accepting the Republican nomination for president in 
1964,
 
109 Jaffa first propounded his constitutional theory through his 
magisterial interpretation of the Lincoln-Douglas debates in Crisis of 
the House Divided, a theory he subsequently reiterated, even evange-
lized for in countless articles, lectures, and reviews.  As law school 
constitutional theorists became more influential, and conservative 
academics found their foothold in this new world by hawking their 
own trademarked theory of textual interpretation—“originalism”—
the political scientist Jaffa later recast his views in the prevailing “ori-
ginalist” idiom.110
The pre-originalist Jaffa was no uncritical worshipper of the 
American Founding.  His writings emphasized its incompleteness, the 
sad failing arising out of the compromises the Founders had made 
with chattel slavery.
   
111  These compromises, Jaffa argued, represented 
a more fundamental “inability” or unwillingness on the part of the 
Founders to commit themselves in the Constitution to the eternal, 
unchanging, God-given principles that had served as the grounding of 
the nation’s Declaration of Independence.112
 
 108. The most famous case of the public ascent of the Straussians, of course, is that of 
the University of Chicago political philosopher Allan Bloom, whose The Closing of the Ameri-
can Mind (1987) became a conservative cause célèbre.  
  Jaffa contended that 
 109. “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice . . . .  And . . . moderation in the 
pursuit of justice is no virtue.”  Barry Goldwater, Speech Accepting the Republican Nomi-
nation for President (July 16, 1964) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm.  See KARL HESS, MOSTLY ON THE EDGE 
168–70 (1999) (attributing the line to Jaffa but stating he later learned it was a paraphrase 
of Cicero). 
 110. See HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A 
DISPUTED QUESTION (1994) (discussing the debate surrounding originalism); Jaffa, Equali-
ty, supra note 92, at 504 (“The principles of the Declaration . . . are present in the very first 
words of the Constitution as those words were understood by those who drafted and 
adopted it.”); JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78 (repudiating the revisionist approach to the Civil 
War).  On the shift to originalism in conservative constitutional thought, see generally Ken 
I. Kersch, Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive Development of Constitutional 
Conservatism in National Review, 25 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 1 (2011). 
 111. See, e.g., JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 14 (discussing the Founders’ acknowledge-
ment that slavery was in conflict with the doctrine of the American Revolution, and their 
failure to end it despite this). 
 112. See id. at 315. 
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the capacity of the people to govern themselves, democracy, is “dem-
onstrated” when the nation commits itself to living under submission 
to the natural law (the laws of nature and Nature’s God referenced in 
the Declaration), which is the embodiment of timeless and objective 
standards of right and wrong.113  It was Abraham Lincoln who, bela-
tedly, had completed the Constitution by placing the Declaration’s 
commitment to natural rights at its core, redeeming America’s (near-
ly) fatally flawed Founding with “a new birth of freedom.”114
Like all Straussians, Jaffa read the American constitutional tradi-
tion through the lens of classical political philosophy.  Tracing the 
term for “constitution” used in the ancient Greek texts—politeia—Jaffa 
noted that, for Aristotle, a polis was a partnership in politeia, where po-
liteia “is not the laws, but rather the animating principle of the laws, by 
virtue of which the laws are laws of a certain kind.”
  
115  In finding the 
“life principle of the nation” in the Declaration, Jaffa explained, Lin-
coln understood American constitutionalism in precisely the same 
way.116  For Lincoln, Jaffa observed, “the relation of the famous prop-
osition to the Constitution and Union corresponded to the relation of 
soul to body.”117
This story of national redemption, pivoting on Lincoln, informed 
not only Jaffa’s account of emancipation, but also his reading of the 
entire arc and spirit of American history, as instantiated in its consti-
tutional politics, from the Founding to the present.  That politics is 
imagined as involving a perpetual, epic, and millennial conflict be-
tween the partisans of (unredeemed) legal positivism, and a (saved) 
polity anchored in an uncompromising faith in natural law; a conflict 
between self-government understood as embodying what the people 
will, and self-government as embodying a struggle for the polity’s 
adoption of what it ought to will.   Jaffa believes the nation’s very sur-
vival depends upon a perpetually renewed national commitment to a 
redeemed Constitution—a Constitution that embodies (through the 
 
 
 113. Id. at 314–15. 
 114. Lincoln spoke of the nation’s “new birth of freedom” in his Gettysburg Address.  
President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/gettyb.asp.  
 115. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 331.  Jaffa, like many Straussians, was trained in an-
cient classical languages and believed that the wisest and deepest political philosophy was 
articulated by the ancient Greeks. 
 116. Id. at 330. 
 117. Id. at 332. 
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principles of the Declaration, as vindicated by Lincoln) fixed, eternal 
standards of equality, justice, and truth.118
This epic conflict and choice was publicly argued in its most 
dramatic and sophisticated form in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, 
which Jaffa pronounced the world’s greatest political and philosophic 
text.  There, Lincoln and Douglas did no less than debate “the univer-
sal meaning of the Declaration.”
  
119  “No political contest in history was 
more exclusively or passionately concerned with the character of the 
beliefs in which the souls of men were to abide,” Jaffa dramatically 
claimed.120
Neither the differences which divided the Moslem and 
Christian at the time of the Crusades, nor the differences 
which divided Protestant and Catholic in sixteenth-century 
Europe, nor those which arrayed the crowned heads of Eu-
rope against the regicides of Revolutionary France were be-
lieved by the warring advocates to be more important to 
their salvation, individually and collectively.
  He added: 
121
Jaffa found a direct parallel between the position Lincoln took in 
those debates and the conception of classical natural right pro-
pounded by Jaffa’s teacher Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History.
 
122
 
 118. See Charles Kesler, A Special Meaning of the Declaration of Independence, 31 NAT’L REV. 
850, 850 (1979) (noting Jaffa’s commitment to fixed standards of truth and liberty).  The 
mission of the students of the incomparable Leo Strauss is to commit their lives to the dis-
covery and propagation of these truths, and to the idea of the centrality of truth to politics, 
and to the American nation.  Kersch, supra note 
  
Considered by Jaffa to be “the greatest political philosopher of the 
110, at 7.  See generally LEO STRAUSS, 
NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953) (expounding his philosophy of natural rights and 
standards of truth).  Jaffa’s Declarationism was, at one time, the subject of intense contro-
versy within conservative intellectual life.  Kesler, supra, at 850.  Jaffa wrote in significant 
part in opposition to the constitutional theory being advanced by other conservatives em-
phasizing the bourgeois, commercial, middle-class nature of the American Revolution 
(Martin Diamond and Irving Kristol), and the structural nature of the constitutional or-
der, as well as the Burkean, consensus account of U.S. constitutional development pro-
pounded by Willmoore Kendall. Id. at 851–52, 855 (discussing Jaffa’s disagreement with 
Diamond, Kristol, and Kendall).  At the time he was writing, there remained a strong neo-
Confederate strain on the right, advanced most prominently in the work of M. E. Brad-
ford, which Jaffa also took on aggressively.  Id. at 857–58 (discussing Jaffa’s disagreement 
with Bradford). See generally Kersch, supra note 110 (discussing conservative scholars’ ap-
proaches to constitutional issues in National Review, including Jaffa and his contempora-
ries).  
 119. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 308.  Jaffa titled the fourteenth chapter of The Crisis 
of the House Divided “The Universal Meaning of the Declaration of Independence.”  Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1. 
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20th century,”123 Strauss “proved” that by attempting to replace faith 
with reason, modern (as opposed to classical) philosophy “laid the 
foundation of modern atheistic totalitarianism, the most terrible form 
of tyranny in human experience.”124  While studying Plato’s Republic 
under the tutelage of the master at the University of Chicago, Jaffa 
“discovered . . . that the issue between Lincoln and Douglas was in 
substance, and very nearly in form, identical with the issue between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus.”125  Douglas’s defense of “the golden calf 
of popular sovereignty” was in essence the position that might makes 
right—that the majority not only does rule, but should, without any ob-
jective standard of wrong and right to serve as its compass.126  “Lin-
coln, however, insisted that the case for popular government de-
pended upon a standard of right and wrong independent of mere 
opinion and one which was not justified merely by the counting of 
heads.”127  “Hence,” Jaffa concluded, “the Lincolnian case for gov-
ernment of the people and by the people always implied that being 
for the people meant being for a moral purpose that informs the 
people’s being.”128
Lincoln, for Jaffa, is the world-historical figure who stood fast 
when the great nation he led was most “tempted to abandon its ‘an-
cient faith.’”
   
129  Through close readings of a number of Lincoln’s 
speeches presented in the form of “Teachings” concerning founda-
tional principles of politics, Jaffa gives Stephen Douglas his due.  Jaffa 
insists that Douglas recognized and acknowledged that chattel slavery 
was morally wrong, not withstanding his support for popular sove-
reignty.130  As a matter of politics, however, Douglas committed him-
self to value neutrality.131  He believed that the substantive issues in-
volving slavery were constitutionally consigned to the state and terri-
territorial governments, and as such slavery was best apprehended 
constitutionally as “a jurisdictional question.”132
 
 123. Harry V. Jaffa, Faith and Reason, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at BR 16 (reviewing 
ROBERT C. BARTLETT, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (2011)).  
 
 124. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 2. 
 125. Id. at 3. 
 126. Id. at 4. 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 2.  
 130. Id. at 44. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 252 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:229 
In his study of Lincoln’s Address before a Young Men’s Lyceum,133 Jaf-
fa explained Lincoln’s very different approach.  For Lincoln, the 
question of the capability of the people to govern themselves “was al-
ways twofold: it referred both to the viability of popular political insti-
tutions and to their moral basis in the individual men who must make 
those institutions work.”134
Here, Jefferson’s decision in the Declaration of Independence to 
substitute “the pursuit of happiness” for John Locke’s protection for 
“property” in his similarly worded Second Treatise on Civil Government 
loomed large for Jaffa.
  Moral institutions could only be made and 
sustained by individually moral men.   
135  This substitution in phrasing proved to Jaffa 
that the United States was founded on the principle of the pursuit of 
moral virtue.  While his contemporaneous fellow conservatives Irving 
Kristol and Martin Diamond were insisting that the American Revolu-
tion was essentially a bourgeois enterprise aimed at mitigating worldly 
evils and the pursuit of worldly pleasures, Jaffa interpreted the philo-
sophical import of the opening words of the Declaration to have 
launched a polity committed to the aspirational pursuit of the su-
preme Good—to “a transcendental affirmation of what it ought to 
be.”136  “If man, in the state of nature, or by nature, pursues happi-
ness, then by nature he pursues a summum bonum and does not merely 
flee a summum malum,” he explained.137  By advisedly substituting the 
phrase “pursuit of happiness” for the word “property,” in other words, 
Jefferson had remedied a core theoretical defect in the political phi-
losophy of Hobbes and Locke, and committed the new nation to the 
pursuit of moral perfection, understood by the lights of objective 
truth.  For Jaffa, this was what the Lincoln-Douglas debates, occa-
sioned by the question of the constitutional status of chattel slavery, 
were all about.138
Jaffa made clear that the issues at stake in those debates are “still 
the fundamental issues in American politics.”
 
139
 
 133. Abraham Lincoln, Address before a Young Men’s Lyceum (Jan. 27, 1838) available 
at http://www.constitution.org/lincoln/lyceum.htm. 
  He expressed (and 
 134. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 185–86. 
 135. Harry V. Jaffa, Another Look at the Declaration, 32 NAT’L REV. 836, 840 (1980) [herei-
nafter Jaffa, Another Look at the Declaration].  
 136. See Kesler, supra note 118, at 851–52 (discussing Jaffa’s disagreements with Kristol 
and Diamond’s views about the American Revolution).  JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 321 
(emphasis in original). 
 137. Jaffa, Another Look at the Declaration, supra note 135, at 840. 
 138. Id. 
 139. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 7. 
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continues to express)140 profound concern about whether contempo-
rary Americans have the faith to avail themselves of their rich consti-
tutional heritage.  The great Leo Strauss asked what Jaffa described as 
perhaps the most momentous questions facing the country: “Does this 
nation in its maturity still cherish the faith in which it was conceived 
and raised?  Does it still hold those ‘truths to be self-evident?’”141  
“Strauss believed those questions ought to have been answered in the 
affirmative,” Jaffa tells us.142  “Until they could be so answered, 
[Strauss] did not believe this nation, or the West, could recover its 
moral health or political vigor.”143  It was the mission of conservative 
Americans—and, especially, the students of Strauss—to fight for the 
triumph of this ancient faith.144
B.  John Courtney Murray’s (Thomist) Declaration 
  
Jaffa’s reading of the Declaration of Independence as positing a 
unified supreme Good, with the nature of rights—as with all else—to 
be understood in light of this Good, harmonized well with Thomist 
Roman Catholic theology.145  On this, M. E. Bradford critically ob-
served that Jaffa was attempting to understand America through the 
lenses of systematic philosophy—treating the country as standing for a 
philosophical “proposition” from which all else followed logically, phi-
losophically, and theologically.146  Jaffa, however, made the connec-
tion himself.  Drawing a parallel between the American Founders and 
seminal Catholic thinkers, Jaffa noted early on that “whatever their 
differences,” Thomas Aquinas147
 
 140. See, e.g., Harry V. Jaffa, Faith and Reason, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at BR 16 (review-
ing ROBERT C. BARTLETT, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (2011))  
 and Thomas Jefferson “shared a be-
lief concerning the relationship of political philosophy to political au-
thority that neither shared with the last ten presidents of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association.  It seemed to me that both believed 
it was the task of political philosophy to articulate the principles of po-
 141. STRAUSS, supra note 118, at 1. 
 142. Jaffa, Another Look at the Declaration, supra note 135, at 840. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. (defending Strauss). 
 145. Jaffa’s first book, which immediately preceded Crisis of the House Divided, was a study 
of Thomas.  HARRY V. JAFFA, THOMAS AND ARISTOTELIANISM: A STUDY OF THE COMMENTARY 
BY THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (1952). 
 146. See text accompanying supra notes 92–107 (describing Bradford’s critiques of Jaf-
fa).  
 147. Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican priest who lived in the eleventh century.  His 
most renowned work, Summa Theologica, has been heavily influential in Western philosophy 
and helped Aquinas earn the title Doctor of the Church.  Aquinas was canonized in 1323. 
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litical right, and therefore to teach the teachers of legislators, of citi-
zens, and of statesmen the principles in virtue of which political pow-
er becomes political authority.”148
Unlike modern social scientists and contemporary relativist, posi-
tivist progressive/liberals, both Jefferson and Aquinas were commit-
ted to the position that there are objective standards of right and 
wrong.
   
149  Both believed, moreover, that democratic politics, properly 
understood, involved the advancement of the right and the Good: 
“the laws of nature mentioned in the Declaration.”150
A similar argument was advanced by John Courtney Murray, S.J., 
in his landmark statement of Catholic Declarationism, We Hold These 
Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition.
 
151  Murray, a Je-
suit theologian at the now defunct Woodstock College,152 and fre-
quent contributor to the Jesuit magazine America, was not easily classi-
fied politically in the early 1960s (just as he is not easily classified 
politically today).  While Murray’s thought has many attractions for 
contemporary conservatives,153 in his own time Murray was far from 
conservative.  He challenged not only the Church hierarchy (which 
silenced him for a period), but also the core convictions of the na-
tion’s most conservative lay Catholics, who were convinced that Amer-
ican democratic liberalism was hopelessly incompatible with Catholic 
teaching.  As the first major Catholic theologian to argue aggressively 
for the virtues of religious liberty, pluralism, the “distinction” between 
church and state, and the secular state,154
 
 148. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 
 Murray was celebrated in 
his day by liberals, and remains an important touchstone for Catholic 
liberals today.  In time, despite earlier run-ins with the Church’s reac-
78, at 9. The influential “postmodern” Catholic conserva-
tive thinker Peter Lawler recently described the American Founding as a case of “acciden-
tal Thomism.” Peter Lawler, What Was Said by ME at Georgetown, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 7, 
2011, 2:39 PM), http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/postmodernconservative/2011/02/ 
07/what-was-said-by-me-at-georgetown. Thomistic methodology is also, of course, Aristote-
lean, and this fits naturally into Straussianism as insisting upon a return of political think-
ers—in a fallen, modern world with low (liberal) aims—to the wisdom of the ancients. 
 149. See supra note 148. 
 150. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 11. 
 151. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS 
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).  
 152. Today, a successor institution to Woodstock College, the Woodstock Theological 
Center, is part of Georgetown University. WOODSTOCK THEOLOGICAL CENTER, 
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/ (last visited July 21, 2011). 
 153. See, e.g., Peter Augustine Lawler, John Courtney Murray as Catholic, American Conserva-
tive, in THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (Ethan Fishman & Kenneth L Deutsch 
eds., 2010).   
 154. MURRAY, supra note 151, at 59–60.  All of which he celebrated through his ex-
tended reading of, and support for, the First Amendment.  
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tionary hierarchy, Murray played a pivotal role in the Vatican II con-
clave that—in line with the views he had been advancing—
modernized the Church’s teachings.155  At the very moment when the 
U.S. was electing its first Catholic president, Murray, who was promi-
nent enough to have his picture grace the cover of Time magazine,156 
demonstrated through systematic philosophic argument starting with 
the principles articulated in the opening lines of the Declaration of 
Independence that good Catholics could be good Americans.157
The claim, indeed, went further—in a way that contemporary 
right-wing Catholics have picked up on aggressively.  As Peter Lawler, 
an influential contemporary Catholic conservative political theorist, 
has noted, it was Murray’s conviction that “only the Catholic commu-
nity,” with its richer and deeper tradition and carefully cultivated sys-
tematic philosophy and theology, “could illuminate what was true and 
good about what our founders accomplished.”
   
158
 
 155. Murray was the primary drafter of Vatican II’s Declaration of Religious Freedom.  
See Robert John Araujo, S.J., Forming the Well-Formed Conscience, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 
219, 228 (2008) (noting that Murray had a “major role in drafting” the declaration and 
examining his critiques of Vatican II.) 
  Who better than a 
Catholic theologian trained in natural law to explain to Americans 
the true meaning of the Declaration of Independence, as elaborated 
by its most profound and fervent proponent, Abraham Lincoln, “our 
 156. TIME, Dec. 12, 1960. 
 157. Murray noted that people asked repeatedly whether Catholicism was compatible 
with American democracy. MURRAY, supra note 151, at ix.  He answered, “The question is 
invalid as well as impertinent; for the manner of its position inverts the order of values.  It 
must, of course, be turned round to read, whether American democracy is compatible with 
Catholicism.”  Id. at ix–x .  Murray offered the book as “the reflections of a Catholic who, 
in seeking his answer to the civil question, knows that the principles of Catholic faith and 
morality stand superior to, and in control of, the whole order of civil life.”  Id. at ix.  Mur-
ray continued:  
The Catholic may not, as others do, merge his religious and his patriotic faith, or 
submerge one in the other.  The simplest solution is not for him.  He must reck-
on with his own tradition of thought, which is wider and deeper than any that 
America has elaborated.  He must also reckon with his own history, which is 
longer than the brief centuries that America has lived.  At the same time, he 
must recognize that a new problem has been put to the universal Church by the 
American doctrine and project in the matter of pluralism, as stated in the First 
Amendment.  The conceptual equipment for dealing with the problem is by no 
means lacking to the Catholic intelligence.  
Id. at xi.  These convictions made Catholics (to borrow Albert Murray’s label for African-
Americans) the “omni-Americans”—the group whose worldview most consistently exempli-
fied the soul of the nation.  See generally ALBERT MURRAY, THE OMNI-AMERICANS: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON BLACK EXPERIENCE AND AMERICAN CULTURE (1970). 
 158. Peter A. Lawler, Critical Introduction to JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE 
TRUTHS 2 (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005) (1960) (emphasis added). 
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most ambitious and philosophic president?”159  “If veneration for the 
true accomplishment of our political Fathers is the standard of citi-
zenship,” Lawler argues, “those within the Catholic natural-law com-
munity of thought are the least alienated of Americans today.”160  “On-
ly a Thomistic or natural-law understanding,” Murray stated, “can 
make sense of our framers’ accomplishment.”161
Lawler argued, moreover, that far from being divisive, the Thom-
ist philosophical method provides a common ground for discussions 
between Evangelical Protestants, with their emphasis on Revelation, 
and secular humanists, who prize Reason.  Since its animating pur-
pose is to synthesize Reason and Revelation (or, as Straussians put it 
in one of their animating tropes, “Athens and Jerusalem”), Thomism 
is the best available framework for appreciating, understanding, and 
explicating the implications of the American Founding and the U.S. 
Constitution—or, indeed, of the meaning and creed of the American 
nation itself.
  
162
In We Hold These Truths, Murray described the Declaration of In-
dependence’s statement that “all men are created equal” as a “theo-
rem” or “proposition,” “immortally asserted by Abraham Lincoln.”
  
163
Today, when the serene and often naive certainties of the 
eighteenth century have crumbled, the self-evidence of 
truths may legitimately be questioned.  What ought not to be 
questioned, however, is that the American Proposition rests 
on the forthright assertion of a realist epistemology.  The 
sense of the famous phrase is simply this: “There are truths, 
and we hold them, and we here lay them down as the basis 
and inspiration of the American project, this constitutional 
commonwealth.”  To our Fathers the political and social life 
  
The book is a Thomist exegesis of the nature and implications of this 
theorem or proposition, which Murray pronounced to be, indisputa-
bly, the rock upon which the American nation was built.  Murray 
noted:  
 
 159. Id. at 3. 
 160. Id. at 4. 
 161. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  The Athens (reason) and Jerusalem (revelation) trope 
is also a major axis for Straussian political thought.   
 162. Id. at 22.  Murray states flatly, “Religious pluralism is against the will of God.  But it 
is the human condition; it is written into the script of history.  It will not somehow marve-
lously cease to trouble the City.”  MURRAY, supra note 151, at 23.  It is also “the native con-
dition of American society.”  Id. at 27.  We must, he argues, deal with it.  In this regard, 
Murray celebrated the First Amendment as providing serviceable “articles of peace.”  Id. at 
56.  
 163. Id. at vii, 109. 
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of man did not rest upon such tentative empirical hypothes-
es as the postitivist might cast up. . . .  The structure of the 
state was not ultimately defined in terms of a pragmatic cal-
culus. . . .  [T]hey thought, the life of man in society under 
government is founded on truths, on a certain body of ob-
jective truth, universal in its import, accessible to the reason 
of man, definable, defensible.  If this assertion is denied, the 
American Proposition is, I think, eviscerated at one stroke.164
While the American Proposition as stated in the Declaration and 
re-affirmed by Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address may have once truly 
been “self-evident,” that was no longer clearly the case.
   
165
The next natural question—especially in a vibrant democracy, 
where all power tends to be claimed by the demos—was “Do we hold 
these truths because they are true, or are these truths true because we 
hold them?”
  Hard de-
monstrative intellectual, and perhaps political, work needed to be 
done.  
166  Murray answered the former: The truths are held be-
cause they are true, not simply because (in a democratic, majorita-
rian, consensus spirit) most people happened to believe them.167  
That the American Proposition is true “is a truth that lies beyond poli-
tics; it imparts to politics a fundamental human meaning.  I mean the 
sovereignty of God over nations as well as over individual men.”168
As a nation firmly anchored in a commitment to God’s sove-
reignty, the nation “was conceived [by its Founders] in the tradition 
of natural law.”
   
169  This was the case whatever the religion (or lack of 
religion) of those Founders: as Murray explained, they built better 
than they knew.  This made Aquinas truly “the first Whig,”170 and nat-
ural law “the first structural rib of American constitutionalism.”171  As 
a consequence, the American tradition of free government pivots on 
the “profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free.”172
 
 164. Id. at viii–ix.  
  
 165. Id. at 5. 
 166. Id. at 98. 
 167. Id. at 106–07. 
 168. Id. at 28. It is a commitment to this principle, Murray continued, “that radically 
distinguishes the conservative Christian tradition of America from the Jacobin laicist tradi-
tion of Continental Europe,” the latter of which worships the presumed autonomy of man, 
and his all-powerful individual reason.  
 169. Id. at 31. 
 170. Id. at 32. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 36. 
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We know that people are virtuous only when they are “inwardly go-
verned by the recognized imperatives of the universal moral law.”173
This, of course, affects the way that rights are to be understood 
within the American constitutional tradition.  It is a fact that “[t]he 
American Bill of Rights . . . [is] the product of Christian history.”
   
174  
“The ‘man’ whose rights are guaranteed in the face of law and gov-
ernment is, whether he knows it or not, the Christian man, who had 
learned to know his own personal dignity in the school of Christian 
faith.”175
While there is nothing inherently Catholic about natural law, 
Murray explains that the natural law tradition and, hence, the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition, finds its “intellectual home within the 
Catholic Church.”
  As such, the content of those rights can only be defined and 
understood in light of the nature of the supreme Good, as set out in 
universal natural law.  This places natural law philosophy at the center 
of the inquiry into the nature and proper application of the Bill of 
Rights.  
176  “Catholic participation in the American consen-
sus,” Murray observes proudly, “has been full and free, unreserved 
and unembarrassed, because the contents of that consensus—the eth-
ical and political principles drawn from the tradition of natural law—
approve themselves to the Catholic intelligence and conscience.”177  
While mainline Protestantism may have moved away from the old 
English and American tradition in this regard, its foundations are “na-
tive” to Catholics.  On the fundamentals, the “Fathers of the Church 
and the Fathers of the American Republic” were of one mind.178
Particularly in the modern context, Catholics have a special role 
to play as guardians of the foundations of the American Republic.  No 
society without a substantive core can ever long survive, and, in the 
modern context of pluralism and democracy, the truths set out in the 
Declaration of Independence, according to Murray, articulate that 
core.
 
179  Catholic natural law philosophy helps us understand and ap-
preciate the nature of that core and its indispensability in the deepest 
possible way.180
 
 173. Id. 
 
 174. Id. at 39. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 41. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 42–43.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 74–75. 
 2011] CONSERVATIVE DECLARATIONISM 259 
These understandings have evinced a special attraction for the 
contemporary Catholic right.181  As we have seen, they also harmonize 
extensively with Straussianism, which has a considerable influence in 
conservative intellectual and public policy circles, including magazine 
and book publishing, television (Fox News), and the Internet.182  
Drawing a sharp distinction between themselves and positivists, rela-
tivists, secular progressive liberals, and leftists, these conservatives 
emphasize their grounding in the unchanging, timeless Truths, as 
discerned through application of reason.183
These conservatives emphasize that other nations—most notably, 
Hitler’s Germany and Marxist totalitarian states like the Soviet Un-
ion—had no such grounding, with results that led to some of the 
worst catastrophes in human history.
   
184  Straussians and the contem-
porary American Catholic right suspect that secular progressives, in 
their denial of the natural law foundations of the American nation 
and its constitutional traditions, have more in common with Ameri-
ca’s greatest twentieth century enemies than with its eighteenth cen-
tury Founders, whose principles were set out in the Declaration of In-
dependence’s opening lines, or its Constitution, as redeemed by 
Lincoln through his rededication to the principles of the Declara-
tion.185
 
 181. See generally Welcome from Director Robert P. George, JAMES MADISON PROGRAM IN 
AMERICAN IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS, http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/welcome. 
html (last visited July 31, 2011) (discussing the founding and mission of the program).  
Compare Staff, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE,  http://www.winst.org/people/staff.php (last 
visited July 31, 2011) (identifying Luis E. Tellez as the president of the institute) with Max 
Blumenthal, Princeton Tilts Right, THE NATION, Feb. 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/princeton-tilts-right?page=full (noting that “Luis Tel-
lez . . . runs an Opus Dei student house on the outskirts of the [Princeton] campus”).  The 
most prominent are Princeton’s Robert P. George and the leadership of the Opus Dei 
Catholic order with which George has worked closely throughout his career, including in 
founding Princeton’s James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions (whose 
inaugural scholarly conference was devoted to the Declaration of Independence) and the 
Princeton-based Witherspoon Institute (which is headed by an Opus Dei cleric).  Id. 
 
 182. See generally Mark C. Henrie, Straussianism, FIRST PRINCIPLES (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=871&theme=cotho&loc=b 
(discussing the pervasive influence of Straussianism on modern intellectual conservatism). 
 183. See Richard Sherlock, The Secret of Straussianism, 48 MODERN AGE 208, 211 (2006)  
(“Straussianism rejects the easy relativism and deep nihilism of modernity and replaces it 
with the rhetoric, if not the substance, of natural right.”). 
 184. See id. at 208 (characterizing the development of modern Straussianism as rooted 
in certain Christian truths, in contrast to similar philosophical movements in Nazi Germa-
ny and the Soviet Union that lacked such moral grounds). 
 185. See Media Matters for America, quoting Bill O’Reilly, The Radio Factor (Fox News Radio 
Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200511300007 (comparing 
the modern American secular progressive movement to totalitarian regimes of the twen-
tieth century, and claiming that “[i]n every secular progressive country, they’ve wiped out 
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To many on the right, the situation is grave indeed, not just for 
America, but for the entire world.  As the right-wing priest Father 
James Schall, S.J., of Georgetown University warned in a review of one 
of Jaffa’s books:  
The American situation . . .bears witness to a broader civili-
zational crisis . . . .  [W]hen a universal civilization doubts 
that there are universal principles, the civilization built on 
them largely ceases to exist.  Thus, the issue is not merely an 
American issue.  If America has now adopted relativist prin-
ciples to replace those of its founding, then by retaining its 
universal sense of mission, it spreads profound disorder 
throughout the world wherever it may exercise its influ-
ence.186
On this, Father Schall observed admiringly, “Jaffa . . . writes with 
the vigor and wrath of a prophet.”
   
187
IV. AUTOMATIC FOR THE PEOPLE: SOME CURRENT POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKES 
  For Schall, a conservative Thom-
ist, it was Jaffa who made it possible for all who cared to see how con-
temporary liberals and progressives are the legatees of Stephen A. 
Douglas, while Catholic conservatives and their conservative evangeli-
cal Christian and Mormon allies were anchored firmly in the prin-
ciples of unchanging natural law, and stand proudly in the shoes of 
Lincoln.  
A.  From the Old Neo-Confederatism to the New Southernism 
“If the South Woulda Won, We’d a Had It Made”?188
The Declarationism of Jaffa (and Murray) offered a powerful al-
ternative to the southern neo-confederate conservatism of M. E. Brad-
 
 
religion . . . Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, all of them.  That’s the 
first step.  Get the religion out of there, so that we can impose our big-government, pro-
gressive agenda.”). 
 186. James J. Schall, S.J., Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution: A Disputed Ques-
tion, 41 LOY. L. REV. 77, 79 (1995) (reviewing HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994)). 
 187. Id. at 81.  
 188. HANK WILLIAMS, JR., If the South Woulda Won, on WILD STREAK (Warner Bros. 
Records 1988), banner epigraph on the cover of CLINT JOHNSON, THE POLITICALLY 
INCORRECT GUIDE TO THE SOUTH (AND WHY IT WILL RISE AGAIN) (2006).  There is no 
mention of race in Williams’s lyrics, which identify the essence of the nation “if the South 
woulda won” with being tough on crime, an economy based on goods made in America, 
free-flowing liquor, down-home friendliness, and good ol’ country (and rock and roll) mu-
sic.  See http://www.songlyrics.com/hank-williams-jr/if-the-south-woulda-won-lyrics/ (last 
visited July 31, 2011). 
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ford and his fellow travelers—an alternative that was likely to be espe-
cially appealing to northerners.189
In this section, rather than examining works of serious scholar-
ship, like Bradford’s essays for Modern Age, Jaffa’s Crisis of the House Di-
vided, or Murray’s We Hold These Truths, I turn instead to expressions 
of “popular constitutionalism.”  A prominent forum for “popular con-
stitutionalism” on the contemporary right, Regnery Publishing’s mass-
market Politically Incorrect Guides to American history, politics, and cul-
ture are aimed at correcting for general readers the ostensible myths 
propagated by the mainstream media and liberal academic and politi-
cal elites.
  But what did it offer, as ideology, 
to the South?  The trick was to reject neo-Confederatism, with its at-
tendant racism and segregationism, while also appealing to localist 
southern pride.  Put otherwise, new understandings were needed to 
integrate the South ideologically into the post-civil rights movement 
conservative (Republican) coalition.  Two of the members of the Dec-
larationist Triptych, Jefferson and King, were southerners.  But even 
the Kentucky-born Lincoln—always a tricky proposition for southern-
ers—properly understood, might be made to work.  
190
This new version of the “politically incorrect” South wears its ra-
cial integration proudly on its sleeve, with the guide noting on its very 
first page that “[m]any of us are descended from Scottish settlers and 
African slaves . . . .”
  One number in that series, Clint Johnson’s The Politically 
Incorrect Guide to the South (and Why it Will Rise Again), suggests that, 
while the appeal of M. E. Bradford’s undiluted Old neo-
Confederatism may be fading, what I will call the “New Souther-
nism”—which, while maintaining its conservatism, self-consciously 
seeks to cleanse itself of any taints of racism and segregation—is alive 
and well. 
191  In the spirit of the post-racist “New Souther-
nism,” Johnson promises that his book “won’t be a selective history—
no defenses will be offered for slavery, segregation, or racial discrimi-
nation—but it will give the other side of the story too.”192
 
 189. See, e.g., KEVIN MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT (2011).  
  
 190. The Politically Incorrect Guides, REGNERY PUBLISHING, INC., 
http://www.regnery.com/pig.html (last visited July 31, 2011).  Other such fora for popular 
constitutionalism on today’s right are talk radio, cable news (particularly Fox News), mag-
azines, and the Internet.  All operate in dialogue with each other, to discursively construct 
an ideological world that helps constitute political identity and motivate political action.  
See generally Kersch, supra note 110 (discussing various sources of conservative constitution-
al thought and how they interact with one another to form the identity of the movement). 
 191. JOHNSON, supra note 188, at 1.  Id. at 11.  Indeed, Johnson notes, blacks—many 
fleeing the Northeast—are now moving back to South in droves. 
 192. Id. at 4. 
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Johnson’s “fuller story” is a strange mash-up of old lost-cause his-
tory, arguments retrieved from antebellum pro-slavery tracts, cherry-
picked facts (transmogrified into half-truths), and widely-noted ac-
counts of northern racism and failures on the slavery question that 
the book’s conservative readers are told (incorrectly) have been hid-
den from history by elitist scholars and politicians.  
In this vein, part of Johnson’s fuller story is that southern blacks 
in the Old South were slave owners and Confederates, just like south-
ern whites.193  Not only did southern men of both races own slaves, 
and sign up to protect the Confederacy against northern aggression, 
but they treated their slaves much better than northern slave own-
ers.194  Johnson asserts that the northern novelist Harriet Beecher 
Stowe got the nature of the southern master-slave relationship all 
wrong.  Uncle Tom’s Cabin, after all, was written by a woman who “had 
never been to the South and had never even seen a plantation and 
how they were run.”195
Using the three-fifths clause as evidence, Johnson sets out to cor-
rect the historical record by showing how “Northerners considered 
slaves to be property with no more rights than [animals] while Sou-
therners insisted slaves were human beings.”
 
196  “At several points dur-
ing the debate [during the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention], 
a Southern delegate would try to appeal for full representation of the 
slaves as human beings,” Johnson reminds his readers, “but each time 
the suggestion was voted down.”197  Any true account of southern ra-
cial attitudes, Johnson insists, would explain the ways in which sou-
therners, then and now, “are less race conscious than folks up 
North.”198
 
 193. See id. (describing a prominent South Carolina slaveholder who was black and a 
supporter of the Confederacy). 
  “Just talk to the good ol’ boy driving the pickup truck—he 
 194. See id. at 133 (discussing a black slave owner whose son enlisted in the Confederate 
Army) and 128–29 (explaining that slaves were essential agricultural workers in the South, 
and therefore treated well).  The argument that slaves were treated better in the South 
than ostensibly free workers were in the antebellum industrial North is the major thesis of 
the pro-slavery ideologist George Fitzhugh.  See GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL!, OR 
SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS (1857).  
 195. JOHNSON, supra note 188, at 138. 
 196. Id. at 104. 
 197. Id. at 105.  True enough—not because pro-slavery southerners valued blacks as 
human beings, and northerners saw them as little more than animals, but because count-
ing slaves as full persons for purposes of representation would increase the political power 
of the South in the national government.   
 198. Id. at 37.  
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might even have a John Deere cap-wearing black buddy sitting next to 
him.”199
Johnson concedes that Jim Crow segregation, instituted after Re-
construction, was certainly “an ugly chapter in Southern history.”
 
200  
But it is now gone, he adds, and has not existed for over forty years.201
Radical Republicans sent armed regiments of black soldiers 
into the South as occupation troops and installed black poli-
ticians into local and state government slots, while barring 
all former Confederates from holding office.  Former Con-
federates resented what they saw as interference from the 
North that overthrew responsible government and created a 
sense of entitlement among blacks.  It also bred racial ani-
mosity and led to the creation of a vigilante group, the Ku 
Klux Klan, which expressed the bitterness of former Confe-
derates who had lost their right to vote.
  
What history books do not tell you, Johnson argues, is that racial se-
gregation in the South was actually caused by the North.  In the war’s 
aftermath  
202
This racial violence in reaction to northern tyranny was regretta-
ble.  “[B]ut almost equally damaging was the development of segrega-
tion in the previously unsegregated South: whites-only bathrooms, drink-
ing fountains, restaurants, and seats on public transportation.”
   
203  
“Because white Southerners could not fight the North again or fight 
Reconstruction through their own elected legislatures, black Sou-
therners became the unfortunate victims of white Southerners’ anger 
at Reconstruction’s wrongs.  That was the sad legacy of Reconstruc-
tion.”204
Northern predation hit the South particularly hard because of 
the special nature of southern society as a region defined by its com-
mitment to localism, and its heightened sense of place—both derived 
from the uniquely southern appreciation for the value of diversity.  
For instance, Johnson states that the South was long a “bouillabaisse 
of nationalities.”
 
205  It “once spoke Spanish.”206
 
 199. Id. at 59. 
  Unlike in the anti-
 200. Id. at 38. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 207.  This is borrowed from the long-discredited Jim Crow-era Dunning 
School histography, which is why today’s history books “don’t tell you it.” 
 203. Id. (emphasis added). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 84. 
 206. Id. at 78.  
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Semitic North, Jews held prominent positions in the Confederacy.207  
Strong women were the Confederacy’s “backbone.”208  The South’s 
commitment to localism and diversity has long made the region espe-
cially sensitive to any moves toward centralization and the uniformity 
and standardization it entails.209  “The War wasn’t about slavery,” 
Johnson explains.210 “[I]t was about states’ rights.”211  As Jefferson Da-
vis said in his First Message to the Confederate Congress, “All we ask is 
to be let alone.”212
No sooner does Johnson set out this multiculturalist appeal than 
he undercuts it by underlining that while southerners may have been 
diverse, one thing we do know about those who fought for the Confe-
deracy is that they were Americans.  The Union Army, by contrast, was 
disproportionately comprised of immigrants.  Historians will not tell 
you,  Johnson says—in a strange attack on Lincoln as an avatar of af-
firmative action—that Lincoln promoted Union officers not on the 
basis of their abilities but rather with regard to their ethnicity alone.
 
213
On economics then and now, Johnson asserts that the South has 
stood for “unfettered free enterprise.”
 
214  The tax protests that 
sparked the American Revolution started in the South and it was the 
patriotic South that fought and won the Revolution arising out of 
those protests against taxes levied by a distant central government.215  
In the Revolution’s aftermath, the spendthrift northern states were 
comfortable foisting their war debts on the new national govern-
ment.216  The South was opposed to this swelling of the national debt: 
During the war, southerners had lived within their means and had 
paid down their own debts.  In the end, they were forced to bail out 
the profligate North.217  Similarly, the Civil War, Johnson writes, “was 
not about slavery” but about thirty years of tax hikes in endless succes-
sion by an “overbearing” central government.218  “Something had to 
give.”219
 
 207. Id. at 177–78. 
  Johnson contends that this perennial northern inclination to 
 208. Id. at 195–97. 
 209. Id. at 3, 17–20.  
 210. Id. at 145. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 150.  
 213. Id. at 176. 
 214. Id. at 77. 
 215. See id. at 87–99 (detailing the South’s pivotal role in the American Revolution). 
 216. Id. at 101. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 136. 
 219. See id. at 135 (citing the antebellum tariff controversies). 
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tax and spend was evidenced by the fact that the very first thing that 
the Congress did when its southern members withdrew to defend the 
South during the Civil War was raise taxes.220  At that time, they even 
enacted the nation’s first income tax.  By contrast, “Southerners have 
never liked taxes.  Not then, and not now.”221
Johnson goes on to observe that then, as now, God’s home ad-
dress in the U.S. has always been in the South.  The South is the re-
gion with the strongest sense of right and wrong.
 
222
tend to be more religious, believe what they read in the Bi-
ble, and believe that correct moral paths in life can be found 
by faith in God.  If that makes newcomers to the region un-
easy, then so be it.  The South is a place where people be-
lieve in God.  Those who wish to make it different should re-
turn to the region whence they came.
 “Southerners,” 
Johnson explains,  
223
Accordingly, “when liberal social activists and politicians start 
demanding ‘separation of church and state,’ the ears of religious Sou-
therners perk up.  When they hear that phrase, they know they are 
under attack.”
   
224  In his famous 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, 
the great southerner Thomas Jefferson appropriately opposed the 
idea of the establishment of a national religion, which Southerners 
agreed with, Johnson states.  But when it comes to the notion of sepa-
ration, “Southerners don’t take kindly to liberal activists misappro-
priating Jefferson’s words.”225
Understandably, and fortunately, the South’s religiosity tem-
pered the harshness of its slavery—a humanizing factor absent in 
northern and Caribbean slavery, and northern industrial capitalism.  
“Pastors all over the South,” Johnson explains, “held the view that sla-
very was ordained in the Bible and that it was the Christian duty of 
slaveholders to take care of ‘their people.’  For the most part,” he 
concludes, “they apparently did.”
 
226
In a section entitled “God recognized the Confederacy,” Johnson 
details the support the Confederacy received from the Catholic 
    
 
 220. Id. at 147. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Cf. id. at 3 (noting that “Southerners are religious,” and discussing their traditions 
for honoring the dead).  
 223. Id. at 20. 
 224. Id. at 22.  
 225. Id. at 22–23.  
 226. Id. at 130–32. 
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Church.227  He describes Pope Pius IX’s longstanding friendship with 
Jefferson Davis, the Pope’s decision (at Davis’s request) to discourage 
European Catholics from enlisting in the Union Army in exchange 
for American citizenship, and the Vatican newspaper’s editorializing 
on the Confederacy’s behalf.228  As a young man, Johnson additionally 
notes, Davis had attended a Catholic school, and had seriously consi-
dered converting to Catholicism.  Of course, other religious leaders 
lent their support to the Confederacy as well, including the Louisiana 
Episcopal Bishop Leonidas Polk.229
“Why did religious men like . . . the pope, and Bishop Polk sup-
port the Confederacy?” Johnson asks.
   
230
Many reasons, but one that is as true today as it was then is 
that they recognized in the South a traditional conservative 
religious society being attacked in an aggressive war by a 
modern centralized state that put state-enforced, coercive 
law ahead of the dispersed authority of families, churches, 
and localities.  A lot of folks up North still think the federal 
government should tell us how to live our lives; folks down 
South think that’s the job of families, preachers, and local 
officials we can know and can hold accountable.
   
231
“Others can joke about the ‘Bible Belt’ all they want, but the na-
tion needs at least one region willing to speak up about what is right 
and what is wrong,” a region with a strong “sense of morals and reli-
gion.”
   
232  “We believe,” Johnson explains, “that [God] prefers folks 
who trust in His ways over those who want to use liberal judges to re-
define marriage and morality.  And that’s not going to change.”233  
“That’s because in the South conservatism is not just a collection of 
opinions that can easily change.  It’s rooted in who we are, in faith 
and family and tradition.”234
The Politically Incorrect Guide does not take a favorable view of 
Lincoln—in no small part because of his alleged racism and opposi-
tion to civil liberties and civil rights.  One of the things “the [h]istory 
[b]ooks [l]eave [o]ut” is that Lincoln did not believe in the social and 
  
 
 227. Id. at 191–93. 
 228. Id. at 193. 
 229. Id. at 191–93. 
 230. Id. at 194. 
 231. Id. at 194–95.  
 232. Id. at 236. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 237. 
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political equality of blacks, and that he favored colonization.235  In this 
regard, Lincoln was no Jefferson Davis.  Davis “had a black foster son, 
and enjoyed taking care of and being around ‘his people.’”236  The 
heartless Lincoln, by contrast, wanted to ship the freed blacks back to 
Africa.237  Johnson suggests that Davis was apparently braver than Lin-
coln, too.  Early in their careers, both had served in the Black Hawk 
War in Illinois during the 1830s.  The Illinois militia of which Lincoln 
was a part studiously avoided actual combat, and Lincoln used the war 
to burnish his resume.238  Davis, by contrast, fought hard, and had a 
strong commitment to military strength and service throughout his 
career.239  Lincoln’s shortcomings aside, however, Frederick Doug-
lass’s Narrative is unambiguously described as “a memorable and mov-
ing account by an exceptional man.”240  While the racist and centraliz-
ing Lincoln is not a man to be too much admired, the New 
Southerner can look admiringly on the thoughts and accomplish-
ments of Frederick Douglass and the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.241
B. Evangelizing the Triptych: Glenn Beck and the Restoration of 
American Honor 
  
For many liberals, the sight of the Mormon former Fox News 
conservative political commentator Glenn Beck holding a rally on the 
steps of the Lincoln Memorial on the anniversary of Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech might have seemed the height of 
effrontery.  Ideologically, however, there was nothing especially auda-
cious about such a rally, since much of Beck’s rhetoric sounds in Dec-
larationism and appeals to its Triptych.  Like Lincoln, King too was a 
Godly Declarationist: seen through post-segregationist, post-racist 
conservative eyes, the key fact about King is that he not only pro-
pounded natural law, the philosophy of the equality of natural rights, 
but, as a Protestant, did so ecumenically by building on the theology 
of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.242
 
 235. Id. at 171, 181, 183–85, 192. 
  Those organizing and 
 236. Id. at 181. 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 119–20. 
 239. Id. at 120. 
 240. Id. at 127. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT supra note 3, at 1308.  See also Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the 
Constitution—The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 
989 (1987) (quoting from Dr. King’s letter: “‘A just law is a man-made code that squares 
with the moral law or the law of God . . . .  An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted 
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attending Beck’s “Restoring Honor” rally—denizens of the post-civil 
rights movement right—were (as they saw it) the self-evident inheri-
tors of this tradition. 
Born in Atlanta, the son of a prominent Baptist minister, King 
too dreamed of reconciliation, and the redemption of the American 
South.  “I have a dream,” he shared, “that one day on the red hills of 
Georgia the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners 
will be able to sit down together at a table of brotherhood,” conclud-
ing, “This is the faith with which I return to the South.”243
During his own rally, Beck called upon his fellow Americans to 
be true to the legacy of the American Founders and Dr. King.  That 
legacy, Beck explained in his welcoming remarks, “has nothing to do 
with politics. It has everything to do with [God,] turning our faith 
back to the values and principles that made us great.”  Something 
beyond man was happening, according to Beck.
 
244  America, on that 
day, began to turn back to God.245
Like the scholar Harry Jaffa, the populist Glenn Beck emphasized 
both the world-historical accomplishments of the American Found-
ing, and its profound flaws.  In his lengthy address to the crowd, far 
from ignoring or downplaying the sin of slavery, and imputing perfec-
tion to the nation’s eighteenth century founders (as liberals often 
wrongly accuse conservatives of doing), Beck spoke of the nation as 
bearing many scars, as having within it, and having manifested over 
the course of its history, both good and bad.
   
246  “We have a choice to-
day,” Beck told the crowd, to “either let those scars crush us or re-
deem us.”247
 
in eternal law and natural law.’”) (internal citation omitted).  These same quotes from 
King are featured prominently on Declarationist web sites such as that of the Witherspoon 
Institute.  See generally Natural Law, Natural Rights and American Constitutionalism, THE 
WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE (2011), http://www.nlnrac.org/ (offering numerous scholarly 
articles and other material concerning King’s proposition).   King’s “Letter from Birming-
ham Jail” is a major touchstone of conservative Declarationists.  See, e.g., Carolyn Garris, 
Martin Luther King’s Conservative Legacy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 12, 2006), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/01/Martin-Luther-Kings-Conservative-
Legacy (discussing the influence of King’s “core beliefs,” as espoused in his “Letter from 
Birmingham Jail” and other texts, on the conservative movement). 
  As metaphor, Beck directed the crowd’s attention to the 
Washington Monument at the other end of the Lincoln Memorial Re-
 243. King, supra note 242, at 1317.  
 244. Glenn Beck, Address at the Restoring Honor Rally (Aug. 28, 2010) (transcript and 
video available at C-SPAN Video Library, http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/videoLibrary/clip.php?appid=598714463). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id. (referencing the scars America has accrued throughout its past). 
 247. Id. 
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flecting Pool.  He asked if the audience noticed—and was willing to 
acknowledge—that the Washington Monument’s marble changed 
color part way up.  This, he explained, is because the builders had 
stopped constructing the monument during the Civil War, and then, 
at its conclusion, set themselves again to completing their task.  
When, after recommitting themselves to begin anew, their work was 
finally complete, they put an inscription on the top of the obelisk fac-
ing east, reading “Laus Deo”— “praise be to God.”248
Turning his attention to the memorial on whose steps he stood, 
Beck called Lincoln “a giant of an American casting a shadow on all 
of us.”
   
249  “We look to a giant for answers,” he told the crowd.250  Then 
Beck recounted how, the previous week, he had brought his children 
to the memorial, and read to them aloud both Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address and his Second Inaugural from the inscriptions on the mo-
nument’s walls.  Moreover, he had hoisted each of them upwards to 
have them touch the very words themselves.251  These great docu-
ments of American history, Beck insisted, are as “alive today just as any 
other scripture is.  It speaks to us from the past.”252  As he stood in 
Washington, D.C.—itself once a battlefield “filled with warriors on 
each side,” Beck then read to the crowd the Gettysburg Address in its 
entirety.253  “[We are] at a crossroads,” he explained.  He said the 
country must decide whether Lincoln’s words still have “relevance or 
meaning for us today.”254
 
 248. Id.  In her speech at the rally, Sarah Palin praised Lincoln as the “Great Emancipa-
tor” who “freed those whose captivity was our greatest shame.”  Sarah Palin, Address at the 
Restoring Honor Rally (Aug. 28, 2010) (transcript and video available at The Sarah Palin 
Blog, http://www.thesarahpalinblog.com/2010/08/video-and-transcript-of-restoring-
honor.html).  “[W]e feel the spirit of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,” she told the crowd.  Id.  
Quoting from the Declaration of Independence, Palin announced that the assembled 
crowd was meeting to honor of “these giants, who were linked by a solid rock foundation 
of faith in the one true God of justice.”  Id.  It was a meeting to “restore America and re-
store her honor.”  Id.  “[H]ere together, at the crossroads of our history, may this day be 
the change point,” Palin said.  Id.  “Look around you. You're not alone.  You are Ameri-
cans! You have the same steel spine and the moral courage of Washington and Lincoln 
and Martin Luther King.  It is in you.  It will sustain you as it sustained them.”  Id.  The 
crowd responded with a wave of chants of “USA! USA! USA!”  Id.  (see video).     
  In his Second Inaugural, Beck continued, 
“Abraham Lincoln found God in the scars of Gettysburg.  He was bap-
 249. Beck, supra note 244. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
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tized and gave the Second Inaugural.  He looked to God and set men 
free.  America awakens again.”255
That very same story of slumber and awakening, of blindness and 
sight, of sin and redemption, is the same throughout history, as “it has 
[been] since the burning bush,” Beck asserted.
 
256  We wander until we 
remember that “God is the answer.”257  Beck appealed to his audience 
to “look to God, [and] make your choice.”258  The Lord is “sending us 
wake-up calls . . . .  We await the resurrection.” 259  He called for all to 
get down on their knees and pray—more, to get down on their knees 
with their children, and pray.  “America,” he proclaimed, “is crying 
out for the truth.”260
Beck then read and provided an extended exegesis of what he 
told the crowd was his favorite part of the Declaration, its conclusion 
affirming that “with firm Reliance on [the Protection of] DIVINE 
PROVIDENCE, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our For-
tunes, and our sacred Honour.”
   
261  As part of the exegesis, Beck told the 
story of his own personal redemption from alcohol and drugs 
through Truth, which he affirmed “shall set you free.”262  He called 
upon the crowd to “heal our nation,” adding that, through us, “the 
world” shall be healed.263
In concluding his address, Beck issued a call for restoring the na-
tion’s preachers—whom he referred to as the country’s “Black Robe 
Regiment”
   
264
 
 255. Id. 
—to their rightful place at the heart of American poli-
 256. Id.  Beck recounts the history of the hymn “Amazing Grace,” written by the captain 
of a slave ship. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis in 
original)). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. The Black Robe Regiment, according to its web site, is a formal, organized group 
that has been organized to serve as  
a resource and networking entity where church leaders and laypeople can net-
work and educate themselves as to our biblical responsibility to stand up for our 
Lord and Savior and to protect the freedoms and liberties granted to a moral 
people in the divinely inspired US Constitution.  The Regiment had its historical 
beginnings during the Revolutionary War when Pastors from across the colonies 
arose and lead [sic] their congregations into the battle for freedom.  Unlike to-
day, the church during this time served as the center-point for political debate 
and discussion on the relevant news of the day.  Today's church leaders have all 
but lost that concept of leading their congregations in a Godly manner in all as-
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tics.  The preachers were the first to say that “all men are created 
equal . . . that right comes from God,” he explained.265  But “[w]e 
have fallen asleep as a nation,” he lamented.  “For 240 years [the 
preachers] have been absent from the American landscape.  The 
Black Robe Regiment is back [again today].”266  At that moment, a 
group of robed ministers lined up behind Beck, hands joined.  Beck 
himself preached, in his peroration: “America: it is time to start the 
heart of this nation again, and put it where it belongs.  Our hearts 
with God.”267  He implored the crowd to go to church and to heed 
those who are teaching “the lasting principles,” the preachers “who 
stand with America and God.”268  “God is the answer,” he con-
cluded.269
V. DECLARATIONIST DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION THROUGH GREAT (AND GODLY) MEN 
 
“The lapse of the American people from the faith of their fathers, like 
that of the people led by Moses, was a lapse from a truth immediately 
accessible.”  Harry V. Jaffa270
Jack Balkin has argued that a forward-looking commitment to 
redeeming the nation from injustice has always been a crucial part of 
the American constitutional order.
 
271  Americans, he maintains, treat 
their Constitution as a form of civic religion that inspires within them 
an impulse to redemptive politics.272
 
pects of their worldly existence and are afraid to speak out against the progres-
sive agenda that has dominated our political system for the past century.  
Through this time the church and God himself has been under assault, margina-
lized, and diminished by the progressives and secularists.  The false wall of sepa-
ration of church and state has been constructed in such a manner that most are 
unaware of its limited boundaries.  The church and the body of Christ has been 
attacked on all fronts and challenged by the progressive courts and groups such 
as the ACLU while we have sat idle in consent. 
  They are particularly inspired by 
the abstract principles and standards that were set out by the nation’s 
founders, and return to those again and again.  By arguing for both 
the reality and the legitimacy of this dynamic of eternal return at the 
http://www.blackrobereg.org/.  
 265. Beck, supra note 244. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 230. 
 271. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011).  
 272. Id. at 249–50.  
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heart of the American constitutional order, Balkin offers his argu-
ment as a species of originalism—a commitment to the proposition 
that the original constitutional understandings of We the People con-
tinue to govern us, actually and rightly, today.273  This is a very differ-
ent vision from standard legal academy accounts of originalism, in-
cluding the “constitution-in-exile version,” which emphasize 
restoration, not redemption.274
The Declarationism of the modern American right is probably 
the most currently influential and vibrant form of redemptive consti-
tutionalism.  I have argued here that we can go beyond the claim that 
a redemptive conservative Declarationism in the second half of the 
twentieth century, on into the first half of the twenty-first, has served 
as a vehicle for the mobilization of constitutional politics on the right.  
It has also served as a vehicle for unifying the diverse strands of the 
Religious Right, and of re-integrating the post-civil rights South into 
the nation as the nation’s (purportedly) rock-solid moral core.
 
275
 
 273.  See generally id. (providing an overview of Balkin’s central arguments); Jack M. Bal-
kin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) 
(same).  
  
 274. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) (expanding upon this more uncommon approach to ori-
ginalism and distinguishing it from its mainstream academic counterpart).  
 275. For examples of the ecumenical unification of the Religious Right in recent years, 
see, e.g., Charles Colson et al. & William Abraham et al., Evangelicals & Catholics Together: 
The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium, 43 FIRST THINGS 15 (1994), available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/evangelicals-catholics-together-the-christian-
mission-in-the-third-millennium-2 (this statement is familiarly known by insiders as “ECT”); 
Gerald L. Bray et al. (Evangelical Protestants) & James J. Buckley et al. (Roman Catholics), 
The Gift of Salvation, 79 FIRST THINGS 20 (1998), available at 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/09/001-the-gift-of-salvation-28 (offering an up-
dated version of the “ECT”). See also Francis A. Schaeffer, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO (2005) 
(advocating for a return of national policies rooted in Biblical principles); A. Scott Love-
less, The Forgotten Founding Document: The Overlooked Legal Contribution of the Declaration of 
Independence and California’s Opportunity to Revive It Through Proposition 8, HUGH HEWITT 
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2008, 10:26 PM, revised Oct. 25, 2008), 
http://www.hughhewitt.com/blog/print.aspx?guid=5ba97d38-5b1c-494e-b573-
82acafc575b5 (discussing the contemporary importance of the Bill of Rights as an enume-
ration of Christian-based natural law limitations).  For a brief, accessible, and illustrative 
Straussian appreciation of Catholic natural law theory, see George Anastaplo, Natural Law 
or Natural Rights? An Appreciation of James V. Schall, S.J., 38 LOY. L. REV. 915, 915–16 (1993), 
and for a Catholic natural law theorist’s appreciation of Strauss, see James V. Schall, S.J., 
The Natural Law Bibliography, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 157 (1995).  See also George Anastaplo, Seven 
Questions for Professor Jaffa, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 507, 528 (1987); RICHARD JOHN 
NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); THE 
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE RECONSIDERED: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (Christopher Wolfe ed., 2009) (foreword by Robert P. George).  See generally 
Kersch, supra note 110. 
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Declarationists are certainly originalists of a sort.  But unlike the 
caricature of conservatives proffered by many on the liberal/left (in-
cluding historians like Nancy MacLean, who dub them neo-
confederates),276
We might usefully consider the most prominent of those models, 
Bruce Ackerman’s, as set out in his ongoing We the People project,
 no one is more self-conscious about the failures of 
the Founding, and the evil of the institution of chattel slavery, than 
conservative Declarationists.  Like the Yale Law School constitutional 
theorists—most notably Akhil Reed Amar and Bruce Ackerman—
Declarationists offer a regime account of American constitutional de-
velopment. 
277 
which shares the redemptionist presuppositions with contemporary 
Declarationism.  While Ackerman’s tripartite model of American con-
stitutional regimes is structured around three (ostensibly) highly par-
ticipatory “constitutional moments”—the Founding, Reconstruction, 
and the New Deal278—contemporary Declarationism is centered on 
selected aspects of the political thought of the three “Great Men” who 
constitute its Triptych: Jefferson, Lincoln, and King.279  The lives of 
Jefferson and Lincoln, of course, are temporally parallel to the first 
two of Ackerman’s constitutional moments (the Founding and Re-
construction), whereas contemporary Declarationists in effect substi-
tute the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s for Ackerman’s 
focus on the New Deal of the 1930s.280
 
 276. Nancy MacLean, Neo-Confederacy versus the New Deal: The Regional Utopia of the Modern 
American Right, in THE MYTH OF SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM 318–19 (Matthew D. Lassiter 
& Joseph Crespino eds., 2010). 
  The Declarationist substitution 
of Great Men for Constitutional Moments, it is worth noting, avoids 
much of the messiness that Ackerman must deal with in discerning 
the values of the sovereign people as a whole during a “moment”—or 
a time period in which there are many political actors, movements, 
interest groups, acts, pieces of legislation, bureaucratic decisions, etc.  
In their constitutional theory, Declarationists choose a single “Repre-
sentative Man”—grounded in a time of stark moral choice by an un-
yielding commitment to “first things”—who is deemed to embody the 
 277. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
 278. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456, 477 
(1989). 
 279. See, e.g., JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 208 (“Lincoln was quite convinced that the 
decisive factor in the great political equations is ‘towering genius’ of the caliber of Wash-
ington and Jefferson or of Caesar and Napolean [sic].  It is they, above all, who demon-
strate the capacity—or incapacity—of ‘the people’ to govern themselves.”).  
 280. Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006). 
 274 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:229 
principles and spirit of the moment, which is considered to be demo-
cratic to the degree it comports with the timeless, universal Truths.281  
The thoughts and actions of these representative men are not taken 
as a whole, but rather by a selection of quotations from a few great 
texts, which are treated as philosophical and theological premises.282
In Declarationist stories both sophisticated and popular, these 
representative men step into the shoes of Biblical patriarchs and 
prophets.
   
283  This is the case not simply in the popular constitutional-
ist speeches by media figures like Glenn Beck, but in works of serious 
political theory too.  Harry Jaffa’s work (as M. E. Bradford discerned 
well) is the most influential case in point.284
In Crisis of the House Divided, Jaffa explained that “Lincoln’s deli-
berate invocation of the analogies with the New and Old Testament 
indicates that the trials of the faith of the forefathers must be redupli-
cated by their subsequent [sic] political savior.”
 
285
 
 281. I borrow the label from RALPH WALDO EMERSON, REPRESENTATIVE MEN (1850), 
which begins:  
  “[T]he task of the 
savior” like Lincoln, Jaffa continued, “differs from, and is in crucial 
respects more noble because it is more difficult than, the task of the 
It is natural to believe in great men . . . .  All mythology opens with demigods, 
and the circumstance is high and poetic; that is, their genius is paramount . . . .  
Nature seems to exist for the excellent.  The world is upheld by the veracity of 
good men: they make the earth wholesome . . . .  Life is sweet and tolerable only 
in our belief in such society; and actually or ideally, we manage to live with supe-
riors.  We call our children and our lands by their names.  Their names are 
wrought into the verbs of language, their works and effigies are in our houses, 
and every circumstance of the day recalls an anecdote of them.  The search after 
the great man is the dream of youth and the most serious occupation of man-
hood . . . .  Our religion is the love and cherishing of these patrons. 
Id. at 9–10 . 
 282. See generally HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986).  Arkes’s title was adopted by Richard John Neuhaus as the 
title for the (once ecumenical, now largely Catholic) conservative religious journal he 
founded, First Things (the same path was followed by Arkes himself, who (recently) con-
verted from Judaism to Catholicism, just as Neuhaus before him converted from Lutheran-
ism to Catholicism—to the point, in Neuhaus’s case, of receiving orders as a Catholic 
priest).  See also MURRAY, supra note 151, at 11 (“In the public argument there must . . . be 
a continued recurrence to first principles.  Otherwise the consensus may come to seem 
simply a projection of ephemeral experience, a passing shadow on the vanishing backdrop 
of some given historical scene, without the permanence proper to truths that are ‘held.’”).  
 283. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 222. 
 284. See M. E. BRADFORD, THE REACTIONARY IMPERATIVE: ESSAYS LITERARY & POLITICAL 
93 (1990) (discussing how the American right utilizes rhetorical discourse grounded in the 
Church). 
 285. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 222; see also PETERSON, supra note 50, at 8 (noting 
the depiction of Lincoln through religious imagery dates at least from his assassination—
on Good Friday, no less—when one contemporaneous poet declaimed that “[h]is blood is 
freedom’s eucharist”). 
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original Founders.”286  “[F]or the republic to live, the act of creation 
or founding must be repeated.” Indeed, Lincoln’s argument, Jaffa 
says, implies that the need for this re-grounding through re-founding 
may be necessary at any time.  The republic can be saved, and the 
rights of its people preserved, however, only by “men of transcendent 
ability and virtue who . . . stand guard outside the community . . . .”287
“The political savior,” Jaffa wrote, “like that other Messiah, must 
await the fulfillment of prophesies implicit in the very conception of 
his own function before he could step forth.”
 
288  In the beginning, the 
Declaration was prophetic.  But “[t]he pillars of the first temple, the 
work of the Revolutionary Fathers, were, alas, not quarried from a sol-
id substance.”289  It was necessary to build “a second temple.”290  Con-
ceived in disobedience to an established order, it would have been 
hard for the Founders to inculcate the necessary reverence for the 
timeless political truths, Jaffa explained.  An “at least temporary fail-
ure” of the Founding was all but “predestined” “because of the inner 
tension, engendered by the idea of equality, between the people’s 
rights and the people’s duties.”291  In time, however, Lincoln “en-
graft[ed] the passion of revealed religion upon the body of secular 
political rationalism.”292
 The “incompleteness” of the Founders’ “excellent and noble” 
work, Jaffa insisted, was  
 
no necessary reflection upon the Fathers themselves.  In as-
serting their independence from the British, they could not 
help appealing to passions of revenge and hatred; nor could 
they, in appealing to the principle of equal rights, avoid set-
ting in train passions which would resist both just and unjust 
restraints.  The people must be taught, as Jefferson taught 
them, to assert their rights.  But they had not yet learned to 
respect what they had asserted.  The people had not yet 
learned to be submissive in the presence of their own digni-
ty . . . .  Whoever sees the law as the product of his will . . . is 
prone to think that all things are lawful.293
 
 286. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 
  
78, at 223. 
 287. Id. at 224. 
 288. Id. at 236. 
 289. Id.  
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 237. 
 292. Id. at 238. 
 293. Id. at 225.  
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They had acted popularly, as a newly constituted people.  But 
they had yet to understand that, in a true democracy, the people are 
subservient to the commands of the natural law.294
“We would now observe,” Jaffa continued, in detailing the 
thought of the man who redeemed America’s Founding, “that Lin-
coln’s political thought is cast almost wholly in the metaphor of a 
double perspective, in which the function of his statesmanship is seen 
either on the analogy of the salvation of Israel from Egypt or the sal-
vation of the world by the Messiah.”
 
295  Through his speeches, it is ap-
parent that “Lincoln’s whole conception of political salvation and of 
the role of statesmanship . . .  necessarily agree[s] in its higher reach-
es with the purposes and methods of the divine teacher.”296  The 
“great central tenet” of the “all men are created equal” clause of the 
Declaration, Jaffa noted, was constantly referred to by Lincoln as an 
“ancient faith.”297  “The truth which, in the Declaration, gave each 
man, as an individual, the right to judge the extent of his obligations 
to any community,” Lincoln made clear in his Gettysburg Address, 
“also imposes an overriding obligation to maintain the integrity, mor-
al and physical, of that community which is the bearer of the truth.”298  
“The sacrifices both engendered and required by that truth—for the 
lapses from the faith are, in a sense, due to the moral strain imposed 
by its loftiness—transforms that nation dedicated to it from a merely 
rational and secular one, calculated to ‘secure these rights’—that is, 
the rights of individuals—into something whose value is beyond all 
calculation.”299
The ‘people’ is no longer conceived . . . as it is in the Decla-
ration of Independence, as a contractual union of individu-
als existing in a present; it is as well a union with ancestors 
and posterity; it is organic and sacramental.  For the central 
metaphor of the Gettysburg Address is that of birth and re-
birth . . . the birth resulting from the baptism or conversion 
of the soul.
  After Lincoln’s address at Gettysburg, Jaffa explained: 
300
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration, often used reli-
gious language, Jaffa noted.  But Jefferson was nevertheless, at base, 
 
 
 294. Id. at 226. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. at 227.  
 298. Id. at 227–28.  
 299. Id. at 228. 
 300. Id.  
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anticlerical and an opponent of “revealed theology.”301  “The pream-
ble to the Declaration of Independence” issuing from the pen of Jef-
ferson “invokes not the God of Israel or the persons of the Trinity but 
the God of Nature and is wholly a document of the rationalistic tradi-
tion.  This God reveals himself, not in thunder from Sinai, nor 
though any gift of faith, inspiration, or private judgment upon sacred 
scriptures.  He reveals himself through ‘self-evident’ truths; i.e., 
through the unassisted natural process of ratiocination.”302
Lincoln, however, achieved on the level of the moral imagi-
nation, a synthesis of elements which in Jefferson remained 
antagonistic.  He incorporated the truths of the Declaration 
of Independence into a sacred and ritual canon, making 
them objects of faith as well as cognition.  Through his in-
terpretation of the Civil War as both a Hebraic and Christian 
ritual atonement, this canon was made sacred to the Ameri-
can people as the Declaration of Independence, of itself, 
could not be made.  This interpretation did not depend for 
its conviction upon the intellectual acknowledgment of the 
truth alone . . . but upon a passionate and passion-
conquering conviction born of the sense of the awful price 
exacted by that truth of its votaries.
  In con-
tradistinction, Jaffa explained:  
303
Jaffa concludes his “teaching” with the observation that “Lincoln 
sought, in a political religion, the reconciliation of the hostile ele-
ments in the American secular and religious traditions . . . by saying 
that one element called for reverence without reason and the other 
reason without reverence.  Yet neither was politically true or viable 
without the other.” 
   
304  The man was (as Clinton Rossiter had aptly de-
scribed him) “the martyred Christ of democracy’s passion play.”305
 
 301. Id. at 229. 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id.  As Merrill Peterson makes clear, the description of Lincoln as a devout Chris-
tian is very much a part of the history of the construction of Lincoln as a political and reli-
gious symbol.  Lincoln never belonged to, or attended, church, and was quite cryptic, to 
the point of evasiveness, in describing his religious beliefs.  He has been made into an 
American Christian symbol, a pious believer, a freethinker, and an infidel, by various bio-
graphers and commentators at various times, each insisting that they had captured the 
true Lincoln.  PETERSON, supra note 50, at 68–81, 136, 217–32, 284, 359–62.  The remaking 
of Lincoln by Jaffa, and contemporary conservatives, is part of this history of the construc-
tion of political symbols.  See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 19 (2d 
ed. 1985) (discussing how democratic institutions “are largely symbolic and expressive in 
function”). 
 304. JAFFA, CRISIS, supra note 78, at 231. 
 305. Id. at 232.  
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C.  The Declarationist Narrative 
The Declarationist narrative I have described here represents 
one strain of the constitutional nationalism forged by the contempo-
rary conservative movement, with the aim of forming movement iden-
tities and allegiances, and distinguishing friends from enemies.  It po-
sitions contemporary conservatives—and the Republican Party—as 
the true heirs and guardians of the legacy of the American Founders, 
Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, Jr.  Far from signaling a 
(wholly) reactionary return to pre-civil rights movement neo-
Confederatism, contemporary conservative Declarationism—with 
sometimes millennialist overtones—looks to the present, and, espe-
cially, the future.  It emphasizes sin, and redemption, with a very 
modern focus on the sin of racism.  It explains to conservatives the 
ways in which, through their rock-solid commitment to the first prin-
ciples of the Declaration, they are the legatees of the Great Men who 
founded the Great Nation, and then redeemed it from the evil of 
chattel slavery, and from the sin of racial segregation.   
Contemporary conservative ideologists are well aware that many 
historical misconceptions are taught in school (through alleged mi-
sinformation spread by academic elites), and that it was liberals and 
progressives who opposed slavery and fought against racism and for 
civil rights.  But conservative Declarationists explain that, as legal posi-
tivists, secularists, and moral relativists, the contemporary liberal-left is 
without an anchor, and has no solid basis for holding either slavery or 
segregation to be wrong.  Like Stephen A. Douglas, they are commit-
ted, ultimately, to the separation of morals from politics—to the posi-
tion that might makes right (a view, it is suggested, they shared with 
America’s communist and Nazi totalitarian enemies). 
Is it under the sway of these very same liberals and progressives, 
conservatives emphasize, that the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted 
upon the severing of religion from public life, declared a constitu-
tional right to abortion306 and homosexual sodomy,307 and is sidling 
up both to the protection of gay marriage and the euthanizing of the 
elderly and the infirm?308
 
 306. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
   
 307. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 308. DVD: Dr. Francis Schaeffer, How Should We Then Live? (Gospel Communications 
International 2009 [1977]); DVD: Dr. Francis Schaeffer & Dr. C. Everett Koop, What Ever 
Happened to the Human Race? (Gospel Films Distribution 2007 [1979]); FRANCIS A. 
SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO (2005); Ken I. Kersch, Roe and the Supreme Court in 
Thick Ideologicial Context: The Conservative Evangelical Documentary Films of Francis Schaeffer 
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association, 
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Conservative Declarationists are committed to reminding as 
many Americans as they can—thereby expanding their political 
base—that there is another American tradition that predates the 
(presumptively malignant) invention of positivist, secular, relativist 
progressivism, a tradition set out by Jefferson in the Declaration and 
redeemed by Lincoln and King: the tradition of natural rights and 
natural law—the real American constitutional tradition with which we 
as a nation were providentially “endowed by our Creator.”309
The polity’s drift away from the bedrock commitment to the 
principles of the Declaration, conservative Declarationists emphasize, 
is rooted in the political philosophy of progressivism—an alien and 
enemy force.  Its impetus (and effect) is nothing less than discrimina-
tion against Christians, whose views are inherent in the nation’s 
founding documents, properly construed—and a persistent assault on 
their liberty of conscience, an assault that would have appalled the 
giants/patriarchs/prophets of the American Constitutional tradition: 
the Founders, Lincoln, and King.
  Al-
though this tradition is all but dead in the precincts of the nation’s 
elites, in its universities, its mainstream media, and on its 
(north)eastern and west coasts, conservative Declarationists repeated-
ly remind us, it is being kept alive by the nation’s devout Christians—
conservative Catholics, conservative evangelical Protestants, and con-
servative Mormons—and remains predominant in the nation’s most 
consistently religious region, the South.  Its institutional home, 
should it not betray its roots, is the contemporary Republican Party. 
310
The restoration of the Declaration of Independence to its 
rightful place as the foundation of the nation’s constitutional politics, 
far from amounting to any breech of the ostensible “wall” of separa-
tion between church and state, Declarationists posit, amounts to a re-
   
 
Newport, R.I., April 2010); Ryan Lizza, Leap of Faith: The Making of a Republican Front-
Runner, NEW YORKER, Aug. 15, 2011, at 54. See also Daniel L. Dreisbach, Lecture for the 
Family Research Council: The Bible and the Founding Fathers (May 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.frc.org/events/the-bible-and-the-founding-fathers.  
 309. Conservative Declarationists all but ignore highly significant distinctions between 
natural rights philosophy, in the Enlightenment tradition, and (Catholic) natural law.  
Theirs is, at base, a symbolic and emotional gambit, and an exercise in distinguishing 
themselves from progressive and liberal opponents, enemies, and traitors.  What counts is 
that both start with the Creator, upon whom they depend, in contradistinction to positiv-
ist, secular liberals and progressives.  
 310. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA, 142–43 (2010). See Robert P. George, Timothy 
George & Chuck Colson, The Manhattan Declaration (released November 20, 2009), 
http://manhattandeclaration.org/the-declaration/read.aspx (commenting that those who 
support progressive rights such as abortion and rights for gays do not support traditional 
rights such as religious rights).  
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demption of the nation and the Founding from its abduction by an 
alternative religion, secular humanism, which has been established in 
its place in significant part through fiat by the U.S. Supreme Court.311  
Since Declarationists believe that the (God-given) principles of the 
Declaration provide the only stay we have against chattel slavery and 
other egregious violations of human rights—see abortion, euthanasia, 
and gay marriage—it was all too predictable that their abandonment 
would lead to Dred Scott, the Holocaust, communist totalitarianism, 
“Obamacare,” the celebration of sodomy, and government funding 
for Planned Parenthood.312
Glenn Beck may not be a man of possessed of the gravitas and 
stature of Jefferson, Lincoln, and King—in part due to the army of 
personal flaws and weaknesses he so readily confesses.  But many con-
servatives will appreciate that, flawed though he is, Beck at least can 
recognize moral greatness, and the rock on which that greatness is 
built.  He knows, moreover, as do other conservatives, that the coun-
try that once countenanced racism, slavery, and segregation was once 
redeemed by a recommitment to the principles of the Declaration.  
Given the dominance of progressivism in our politics and our law, a 
progressivism which has abandoned our grounding commitment to 
natural law, natural rights, and the Constitution which enshrined 
them, conservative Declarationists posit that the nation is once again 
in dire need of spiritual and constitutional redemption.  The prin-
ciples of the Declaration, as elaborated by the giants of the Triptych, 
are our North Star, and will guide us on our way.   
   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A constitutionalism rooted in, and unfolding out of, the natural 
rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence and its Trip-
tych, while consonant with originalism in many respects, clearly moves 
beyond originalism in significant ways.  Originalism, Eldon Eisenach 
has claimed, is largely offered as an interpretive “hermeneutic” for 
judges, advanced by lawyers for other lawyers, and debated within the 
 
 311. See, e.g., DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
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 312. See supra note 308.  See also Harry V. Jaffa, Faith and Reason, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, 
at BR 16 (reviewing ROBERT C. BARTLETT, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (2011)) (re-
ferring to “the crisis of the West, a chaos of moral relativism and philosophic nihilism in 
which every lifestyle, no matter how corrupt or degenerate, can be said to be as good as 
any other.”). 
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elite precincts of American law schools.313  Declarationism—which 
partakes of the patriotic and nationalistic strains implicit within origi-
nalism, but whose sources run much deeper in the broader currents 
of American political history and thought—is much more than a law 
school or judicial hermeneutic.314  Declarationism is more than an ar-
gument about the best way for judges, in deciding cases, to interpret 
the constitutional text: its emphasis is “on defending natural rights as 
part of an American moral narrative of freedom and equality.”  It is 
offered as “a common faith binding together a national community of 
moral equals.”315  As an often either expressly or implicitly religious 
narrative, with an animating focus on redemption, it is, moreover, a 
“discourse through which American citizens [are able to] integrate 
their personal experience and their public lives.”316
Declarationism need not replace originalism as the predominant 
constitutional philosophy of the contemporary American right.  As 
the trajectory of Harry Jaffa’s work makes clear, Declarationism is 
more than capable of selling itself as a form of originalism: after all, it 
venerates the nation’s Founders and their grounding in natural 
rights.  To be sure, Declarationism emphasizes the need for the prin-
ciples of the Founding to be vindicated and redeemed.  But this vin-
dication and redemption must always take place through an eternal 
return to the natural rights philosophy of the American Founders.  In 
the courts, and within the legal academy, Declarationists like Clarence 
Thomas might spar with positivist, contractualist proponents of inter-
preting the Constitution according to its “original meaning,” like An-
tonin Scalia and Robert Bork. All, however, are happy to call them-
selves “originalists,” and arrive at the same conservative positions in 
the great majority of concrete constitutional disputes.
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In the precincts of constitutional politics more generally—where 
constitutional arguments are used to constitute political identities and 
motivate electorates—Declarationism goes beyond originalism.  As a 
species of popular constitutionalism, originalism usefully argues that 
liberal judges and progressives in politics have betrayed the Founders 
by rejecting their legal/contractual stipulations in favor of their own 
personal and ideological preferences and agendas.  Declarationism 
goes further in offering a compelling story about God, Country, and 
Truth, about fall and redemption.  When joined together under the 
umbrella of a single political movement, the combined outlooks offer 
a powerful constitutional politics capable of both affecting legal doc-
trine and altering both the tenor and content of American public po-
licymaking and the practice of American politics.  
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